Time preferences and their life outcome correlates: Evidence from a representative survey = Mivel korrelálnak az időpreferenciák? Egy reprezentatív felmérés eredményeI by Horn, Dániel & Kiss, Hubert János
  
 
 
 
BUDAPEST WORKING PAPERS  
ON THE LABOUR MARKET 
BWP – 2019/1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Time preferences and their life outcome correlates:  
Evidence from a representative survey 
 
 
DÁNIEL HORN – HUBERT JÁNOS KISS 
 
 
 
 
BWP 2019/1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES 
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
BUDAPEST, 2019
  
Budapest Working Papers on the Labour Market 
 
BWP – 2019/1 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
 
 
Time preferences and their life outcome correlates:  
Evidence from a representative survey 
 
 
 
Authors:  
 
 
Daniel Horn 
senior research fellow 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary 
and Eötvös Loránd University 
E-mail: horn.daniel@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
 
 
Hubert János Kiss 
senior research fellow 
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Hungary 
and Eötvös Loránd University 
E-mail: kiss.hubert.janos@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2019 
 
 
3 
 
Time preferences and their life outcome correlates: 
Evidence from a representative survey 
 
Dániel Horn - Hubert János Kiss 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We collect data on time preferences of a representative sample of the Hungarian 
population in a non-incentivized way and investigate how patience and present bias 
associate with important life outcomes in five domains: i) educational attainment, ii) 
unemployment, iii) income and wealth, iv) financial decisions and difficulties, and v) 
health. Based on the literature, we formulate the broad hypotheses that patience fosters, 
while present bias hinders positive outcomes in the domains under study. We document 
a consistent and often significant positive effect of patience in almost all areas (except 
unemployment), with the strongest effects in escaping low educational attainment, 
wealth and financial decisions. We find that present bias associates significantly with 
saving decisions and financial troubles. 
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Mivel korrelálnak az időpreferenciák?  
Egy reprezentatív felmérés eredményei 
 
Horn Dániel – Kiss Hubert János 
 
Összefoglaló 
 
Egy magyar reprezentatív felmérés kereteiben mértük fel a válaszadók időpreferenciáit, 
nem ösztönzött módon. A kutatásban azt vizsgáljuk, hogy az időpreferencia egyes 
aspektusai – a türelem illetve a jelen-torzítottság – hogyan függnek össze különböző 
kimenetekkel az életút során. A tanulmányban azt vizsgáljuk, hogy az időpreferencia e 
két aspektusa hogyan függ össze az i) oktatási szinttel, ii) munkanélküliséggel, iii) 
jövedelemmel és vagyonnal, iv) pénzügyi döntésekkel és pénzügyi nehézségekkel, v) 
egészséggel. Az irodalom alapján azt feltételezzük, hogy a türelem pozitívan, míg a jelen-
torzítottság negatívan függ össze a pozitív élet-kimenetekkel. Adataink alapján azt 
mondhatjuk, hogy a türelem szinte az összes vizsgált kimenettel (kivéve 
munkanélküliség) szignifikánsan és a várt irányban függ össze. A legszorosabb az 
összefüggés az alacsony iskolázottsággal, vagyonnal és a pénzügyi döntésekkel. A jelen-
torzítottság összefüggései a kimenetekkel gyengébbek, de szignifikáns összefüggést 
találunk a megtakarítási döntések és a pénzügyi nehézségek esetében. 
 
 
Tárgyszavak: oktatási szint, pénzügyi döntések, pénzügyi nehézségek, jövedelem, 
vagyon, türelem, jelen-torzítottság, kockázati preferenciák 
 
 
JEL-kódok: D12, D14, D31, D90, I12, I21, J6 
 
 
Noname manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Time preferences and their life outcome correlates: Evidence
from a representative survey
Da´niel Horn · Hubert Ja´nos Kiss
Abstract We collect data on time preferences of a representative sample of the Hungarian
population in a non-incentivized way and investigate how patience and present bias associate
with important life outcomes in five domains: i) educational attainment, ii) unemployment, iii)
income and wealth, iv) financial decisions and difficulties, and v) health. Based on the literature,
we formulate the broad hypotheses that patience fosters, while present bias hinders positive
outcomes in the domains under study. We document a consistent and often significant positive
effect of patience in almost all areas (except unemployment), with the strongest effects in escaping
low educational attainment, wealth and financial decisions. We find that present bias associates
significantly with saving decisions and financial troubles.
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1 Introduction
Economic analysis is based on the tenet that individuals maximize utility functions that are
representations of preferences, given some constraints. One of the most basic preferences that
appear in almost all introductory books on Economics are time preferences. There are two relevant
aspects of time preferences that we study in this paper. On the one hand, patience reveals
how an individual values the future relative to the present, hence it plays an essential role in
intertemporal decision-making. Importantly, patient individuals have a low discount rate, so
they appreciate future benefits more than their more impatient peers. Thus, as the cost of effort
generally materializes in the present, more patient individuals are expected to invest more today
in things that bear fruits tomorrow. As a consequence, more patient individuals may tend
– to invest more in their human capital by studying more;
– to choose long-term financial investments (e.g. retirement savings);
– to lead a more healthy life.1
The other aspect of time preferences is time consistency. Time consistent individuals have
a constant discount rate between any two equidistant points in time. However, a large share of
individuals are not time consistent, but have a higher immediate discount rate relative to their
long-run discount rate. In other words, many individuals are more impatient in the short run
than in the long run. These present-biased individuals place excessive weight on immediate costs
compared to benefits in the future. This tendency may lead to procrastination, because even if
we want to achieve a goal (e.g. save more money or lose weight), given we perceive the immediate
costs to be too high, we may want to delay incurring those costs. Therefore, more present-biased
individuals may have a tendency, for instance, to underinvest in educational attainment or to
have financial problems.
There is an active empirical literature that attempts to measure individual time preferences
and link those preferences to individual decisions. This paper contributes to this literature. We
elicited time preferences in a survey in Hungary. Our data have at least three desirable features.
First, the survey is representative of the adult population of a whole country, which is still not
very common of papers studiying individual preferences (the only exceptions being Bradford
et al., 2017; Falk et al., 2018, to the best of our knowledge). Second, it provides a very rich
set of controls (including risk attitudes), which allows us to see if our preference measures have
predictive power once we control for a wide range of variables. In fact, one of the contribution of
the paper is to see how the association between our preference measures and the life outcomes
changes as we add more and more controls. Third, similar studies have been carried out, but
mostly in the US and Western countries. Less is known about other, in our case Central-Eastern
European, countries.
We link our time preference measures to life outcomes in five domains: i) educational attain-
ment, ii) unemployment, iii) income and wealth, iv) financial decisions and difficulties, and v)
health. In general, we hypothesize that more patient individuals fare better in these domains
(e.g. have better educational attainment or higher income), while present bias may lead to worse
outcomes in these domains, ceteris paribus. We find that with the exception of unemployment, pa-
tience is associated with the outcomes that we investigate in the expected way. Moreover, these
associations are often significant even if we control for a host of variables. We document the
strongest effects in escaping low educational attainment, wealth and financial decisions. Present
1 Note that these accumulation decisions affect the physical / human capital and factor productivity in the
society that in turn are direct factors determining the income of the country. There is an important literature (e.g.
Chen, 2013; Doepke and Zilibotti, 2014; Galor and O¨zak, 2016; Dohmen et al., 2018a) that studies how different
determinants, like patience, affect macroeconomic growth.
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bias often has no consistent effect, though we report strong effects in the expected direction in
financial decisions and financial difficulties.
Our findings complement the existing literature in the following ways. First, we investigate
if results, found on non-representative samples, hold for our representative sample as well. For
instance, Meier and Sprenger (2010) find that present-biased individuals are more likely to have
excessive credit card borrowings, but their sample is by no means representative of the US
population. The same is true for Burks et al. (2015), who study the predictive power of time
preferences on a special educational performance using a non-student population, but one may
have doubts to which extent truck drivers’ choices reflect those of the wider population. Second,
we study outcomes that are not investigated in other papers that use representative samples.
For example, one of the papers that is closest to ours is Bradford et al. (2017) that also uses a
representative (and incentivized) sample to see how time preferences correlate with health, energy
use and financial outcomes. Our scope of life outcomes is wider, as we also study educational
attainment and unemployment (but we do not consider energy consumption). Third, we are
among the few (along with Meier and Sprenger (2010) and Bradford et al. (2017)) that measure
patience and present bias (for instance, Falk et al. (2018) have a global, representative survey,
but they do not have data on present bias).
2 Data and hypotheses
In this section we briefly present the data, and based on the literature we formulate hypotheses
on the possible associations between our time preference measures and life outcomes in the five
domains. We also discuss some issues related to time preferences.
2.1 Data and preference tasks
The TA´RKI Social Research Institute carries out a quarterly survey called Omnibus with a ran-
domized sample of about 1000 individuals aged 18 and over. The survey is based on personal
interviews, applies random selection sampling, and importantly it is representative of the Hun-
garian adult population. The Omnibus survey has a fixed part that is asked in each quarter.
It comprises the following demographic data: gender, age, family status and structure, level of
education, labour market status, individual and family incomes, wealth and financial situation,
social status, religiosity. This gives a fairly comprehensive picture of the respondent along many
relevant dimensions. In addition, researchers can add questions to the survey at a cost. TA´RKI
charges for the new questions based on the supposed time it takes to answer them.
We introduced three items into the survey of January, 2017.2 The first item included 5 ques-
tions regarding time preferences that served to find the approximate indifference point of the sur-
veyed individuals between an earlier and a later amount of money. Similarly to Falk et al. (2018)
we used the staircase (or unfolding brackets) method (for details see, for instance, Cornsweet,
1962) as it efficiently utilizes the available number of questions to approximate the indifference
point between a present and a future payoff. The questions are interdependent hypothetical bi-
nary choices between 10000 Forints (about 32.26 EUR / 34.48 USD) today or X Forints in a
month. The 10000 Forints remain constant during the 5 questions while the amount X is changed
systematically depending on the previous answers. For instance, if an individual prefers 10000
Forints today to X=15500 Forints in a month, then it indicates that her indifference point is
higher than 15500 Forints, hence in the next question X is increased. There are 25 = 32 possible
2 For the exact wording of all three items see section A in the Appendix.
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outcomes corresponding to the last choice, that is, our proxy for the indifference point. Section
B in the Appendix contains the whole structure of the staircase method with the numbers that
we used.
The second item measured risk attitude with a simple question that asked how much of 10000
Forints the individual would place as a bet in the following gamble.3 A bag contains 10 black
and 10 red balls and one is drawn randomly. The individual can choose a colour (black or red)
and if the colour of the ball drawn coincides with her chosen colour, then she wins the double
of the bet she placed. If the colour of the ball drawn from the bag is different from the chosen
colour, then the bet is lost. We explained also that the amount not placed as a bet would be
given hypothetically to the individual. We regard the amount placed as bet as a natural measure
of risk attitude.4
The third item also measured time preferences and was almost identical to the first one, but
the time horizon was different as the earlier hypothetical payoff occurred in a year, while the later
one in a year and a month. Note that the distance between the payoffs (1 month) is the same
as in the first item. The order of the preference tasks was the same as described here. As only
the risk attitude measure separated the time preference items, possibly there were individuals
who strived to be consistent in the described way, so potentially we underestimate the extent of
present bias in our sample.
2.2 Five domains and the overarching hypotheses
We examine five domains where we expect to see correlations between time preferences and
outcomes. Our data do not allow us to establish causal relationships, so we limit ourselves to
speak about associations between our preference measures and the life outcomes.
2.2.1 Educational attainment
There are many studies that show that non-cognitive skills - and among these skills many related
to time preferences - are important determinants of educational attainment (e.g. Duckworth and
Seligman, 2005; Duckworth et al., 2012; Duckworth and Carlson, 2013; Borghans et al., 2016).
Golsteyn et al. (2014) use longitudinal data from Sweden that links measured time preference
at age 13 to schooling outcomes gained from administrative registers. Their results indicate that
high discount rates (that is, less patience) are related to worse school performance and educa-
tional attainment. Burks et al. (2015), Cadena and Keys (2015), Non and Tempelaar (2016) and
De Paola and Gioia (2017) report similar findings in different countries and settings. Falk et al.
(2018) find that this result is valid when considering representative data from 76 countries.5
Using data from Vietnam, Tanaka et al. (2010) find also that more patient individuals achieve
higher educational levels, but they do not find relation between present bias and educational
attainment. The presence of self-control problems and procrastination (both tightly related to
present bias) in an educational context has been shown in many studies (e.g. Ariely and Werten-
broch, 2002; Novarese and Di Giovinazzo, 2013; Bisin and Hyndman, 2014). Negative association
of present bias with school performance is documented in several papers (for instance, Wong,
3 We followed Sutter et al. (2013) when choosing this task.
4 Our measure is very similar to the investment game of Gneezy and Potters (1997). Crosetto and Filippin
(2016) compare four experimental risk elicitation methods, among them the investment game. There is no clear
best elicitation method, different methods have different advantages and shortcomings. Importantly, a message of
the study is that all the methods are useful to distinguish individuals according to their risk preferences.
5 However, Bettinger and Slonim (2007) fails to find correlation between patience and school performance in a
dataset from the US.
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2008; Horn and Kiss, 2018). The importance of these findings stems from the fact that educa-
tion outcomes determine success in life to a large extent as captured, for instance by the wage
premium (e.g. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004)) or the positive relation between schooling
and other socioeconomic outcomes (e.g. Grossman, 2006). Overall, the evidence in the literature
suggests that there is a positive relationship between patience and educational attainment. Even
though the evidence seems weaker, we also expect to find a negative association between present
bias and educational attainment.
In our dataset, we have information on the respondents’ education level. We define two
outcome variables. The first one is a dummy that indicates if an individual was not able to
achieve a higher schooling level than the elementary school. The second one is also a dummy
revealing if an individual has a university diploma or not. Hence, our first education variable
informs if an individual is not able to escape low educational attainment, while the second one
captures if an individual reaches the highest level of schooling. Based on the previous hypotheses,
we expect to see that more patient individuals tend to be less (more) likely to end up with a low
(high) level of education. We conjecture that present bias is positively (negatively) associated
with a low (high) level of education.
2.2.2 Unemployment
There are various examples that show that time preference associates with unemployment. Caspi
et al. (1998) find that low self-control in childhood and adolescence predicts youth unemployment
in New Zealand. Burks et al. (2012) show that truck driver trainees who were more impatient or
present-biased were more likely to quit the training program in the US. Golsteyn et al. (2014) re-
port that patience is negatively related to unemployment using data from Sweden. Using British
data, Daly et al. (2015) find that children that had low self-control were more likely to be unem-
ployed as an adult. Using a Dutch longitudinal survey, van Huizen and Alessie (2015) document
that both on-the-job search and work effort increase with patience which may imply a lower threat
of unemployment. In the database we have data on the employment status of the respondents. We
consider only individuals who are active on the labour market, so we disregard students, retired
and other inactive individuals and we test if unemployment is negatively (positively) associated
with patience (present bias), ceteris paribus.6
2.2.3 Income and wealth
Time preferences might also relate to income and wealth. Lawrance (1991) documents that
in the US poor households exhibit less patience than rich ones. Yesuf et al. (2008) reports
similar findings for Ethiopian, while Pender (1996) for South Indian households. Using data
from Vietnam, Tanaka et al. (2010) find that income and patience are positively correlated,
however there is no correlation between present bias and income. Moffitt et al. (2011) report
that even after controlling for social class origin and IQ, self-control measured in childhood has
predictive power for income earned as an adult in New Zealand. Golsteyn et al. (2014) document
that patience is positively related to earnings and disposable income in Sweden. Studying low-
income US households, Carvalho et al. (2016) find evidence that scarce resources (low income and
wealth) is able to affect the willingness to delay gratification: poor participants (in their study
individuals before payday) were more present-biased than participants with more resources.
In our survey, there were two questions on the individual post-tax (net) income. Respondents
could either report an estimated average monthly amount of their income (547 out of the 998
6 Of the 998 respondents, 639 are employed or self-employed, 269 retired, 32 unemployed, 19 students, 22 on
maternal leave, while the rest is other inactive.
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surveyed individuals have done so) or could indicate the level of their income on an 8-level cat-
egorical variable (for 176 out of the 998 individuals). We have imputed the 8-category income
variable with the continuous income variable for the controls, and conversely imputed the contin-
uous income with the means of the categories, when we used income as the dependent variable.
Thus in all regressions below we will control for the individual income using dummy variables
for the 8-category income (and an additional dummy for the missing responses), while we use a
continuous income measure for the analysis of income on time-preferences.
To proxy wealth we have generated the principal factor of six dummy variables indicating
whether the respondent has a 1) car, 2) dishwasher, 3) washing machine, 4) landline phone, and
5) whether the respondent owns the property she lives in, and whether 6) she owns another real
estate property. We have replaced missing values (for 34 respondents of the total 998) on this
principal factor with zero (the average value) and included a missing dummy to control for this
in the regressions below.
Based on the literature, we conjecture that patience and income (and wealth) are positively
correlated. Moreover, we expect a negative relationship between present bias and income (and
wealth).
2.2.4 Financial decisions and financial difficulties
Banking and saving decisions Related to the previous point, wealth may be due to saving de-
cisions, so time preferences may influence those decisions as well. Sutter et al. (2013) find that
impatience predicts saving decisions of Austrian adolescents (more impatient ones are less likely
to save). Bradford et al. (2017) report positive relationship between patience and different forms
of savings (credit card balance, retirement and non-retirement savings) for a representative sam-
ple of the US adult population. Falk et al. (2018) find that this finding holds globally. Atlas et al.
(2017) study mortgage choices in the US and also the management of this obligation. They find
that those who are more impatient and present-biased tend to choose mortgages that minimize
up-front costs. Interestingly, while impatience increases homeowners’ willingness to abandon a
mortgage, present bias does the opposite, showing that both aspects of time preference may be
important in financial decisions.7 Interestingly, many studies (e.g. Chabris et al., 2008; Ashraf
et al., 2006) do not find a significant relationship between patience and financial decisions. More-
over, some do find association between those decisions and present bias (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2006).
The relation between self-control problems (a manifestation of present bias) and saving decisions
have been also proposed (see for instance Thaler and Shefrin, 1981; Thaler, 1990). Evidence on
this relationship is provided in numerous papers (e.g. Laibson et al., 1998; Angeletos et al., 2001).
The literature is suggestive that more patience is related to more saving, but present bias may
hinder carrying out saving plans.
In our dataset, we have extensive data on financial decisions. More precisely, we know if
an individual in the sample has a 1) bank (or credit) card, 2) owns shares, 3) has a checking
account, 4) has retirement savings, 5) has life insurance. From these variables, we create an
index variable meant to capture financial decisions in general.8 Principal factor analysis yields
two meaningful indices. The first has high factor loadings from variables 1 and 3 (whether the
individual has a checking account and bank (or credit) card), while the second has higher positive
7 The evidence is not unequivocal. Gerardi et al. (2013) find no correlation between patience, present bias and
various forms of mortgage delinquency (e.g. being behind with the payment or missing part of the payment) in a
US sample.
8 Chabris et al. (2008) suggest that it is more likely that we may find correlations between the preference
measures and aggregated measures of behaviors (e.g. overall saving decisions), than single components (e.g. owning
share or having retirement savings), because in the latter idiosyncratic effects may play a big role, while they tend
to cancel out as more and more individual behaviors are added to an aggregate measure.
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factor loadings from variables 2, 4 and 5 (owning shares / having retirement savings / having life
insurance), and negative factor loadings from 1 and 3. We call the first factor banking decisions
and the second saving decisions. The banking decision index indicates if an individual has at
least reached the lowest levels of financial inclusion. The second index points to higher levels of
financial sophistication. We impute missing values with zero in both of these indices and include
a dummy for the imputed values in the estimations below. Based on the literature, we expect that
more patient individuals tend to i) use more the basic banking services, ii) save more. Regarding
the effect of present bias, we expect to see the opposite effects.
Financial difficulties There is evidence that time preferences may be related to financial trou-
bles. Chabris et al. (2008) document that more patient individuals are more likely to pay their
bills without problems in a US sample. Meier and Sprenger (2010) report that present-biased
individuals are more likely to have credit card debt and tend to have significantly higher amount
of debt, but patience does not affect credit card debt. Moffitt et al. (2011) document that chil-
dren in New Zealand, who had self-control problems, later (at the age of 32) were less likely to
save and faced higher financial distress (money-management difficulties, credit problems). Burks
et al. (2012) show that credit scores correlate positively with patience using a special US sample
(truck driver trainees). Arya et al. (2013) find the same and show that impulsivity plays also a
role. Using data from the US, Meier and Sprenger (2012) show that patience predicts creditwor-
thiness.9 Stango et al. (2017) show that present bias is negatively correlated with an aggregate
index of financial condition, a finding based also on a US sample.
Concerning financial difficulties, we know whether an individual has problems of 1) paying
public utility bills, 2) servicing a mortgage or 3) other types of loans. Using principal factor analy-
sis, from these three dummy variables we create an index that proxies the extent of the individual
financial difficulties. All three variables had similarly high positive factor loadings. Based on the
extant literature, we expect more patience to be associated with less financial troubles, while we
conjecture the opposite relationship between present bias and financial difficulties.
2.2.5 Self-reported health
Many associations have been established between time preferences and health issues. Regarding
obesity, Komlos et al. (2004), Borghans and Golsteyn (2006), Weller et al. (2008) and Golsteyn
et al. (2014) find that there may be an expected link between the two. Courtemanche et al.
(2015) shows that not only patience, but also present bias matters for obesity in the US. Khwaja
et al. (2007), Bradford (2010), Scharff and Viscusi (2011) and Sutter et al. (2013) argue that
general measures of time preference and self-control are related to smoking behavior. Burks et al.
(2012) document that more impatient and present-biased individuals in their US sample are more
likely to smoke, but they do not find any relation between the two aspects of time preference
and the body mass index. Chabris et al. (2008) report that, in the US, more patient individuals
are less likely to smoke, have a lower BMI and are more likely to exercise . Wang and Sloan
(2018) document that present-biased individuals with diabetes are less likely to follow clinical
guidelines.
In more general terms, Bradford et al. (2017) find that both patience and present bias af-
fect self-reported health and also different health behaviors (e.g. obesity, BMI, smoking, binge
drinking) in the US. Analyzing data from New Zealand, Moffitt et al. (2011) find that self-
control problems in childhood predict health problems as adults. However, there are studies that
9 Results are not unambiguous as Harrison et al. (2002) find no correlation between individual long-run discount
factors and borrowing behavior.
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report no evidence on the relationship between time preference and self-reported health (e.g.
Conell-Price and Jamison, 2015).
In our survey, the respondents assess their health status on a 5-item scale ranging from very
bad to very good. This is the only information on health. Bradford et al. (2017) has also a self-
assessment question health with a 5-item scale. Similarly to them, we form binary variables, the
first showing if the individual has a good self-reported health (the two top notches of the 5-item
scale), while the second shows if the individual has bad self-reported health (the bottom two
notches of the 5-item scale). Based on the literature, we expect a positive (negative) relationship
between patience (present bias) and self-reported health.
Reviewing the literature in the five domains reveals that effects are not always clear and
unambiguous. However, findings in the different domains point in the same direction. Overall,
we expect patience to foster accummulation decisions, while present bias to have the opposite
effects.
2.3 Other variables in the survey
As mentioned earlier, the survey contains rich socio-demographic data. We have information
on the gender, age and the marital status of the respondent, and we also know the number of
their children (if any). We know the region and the type of the settlement (village, township,
city) where the respondent lives. We have information on the profession (e.g. skilled worker,
agriculture, manager, housewife) and if she is employed in the public sector or not. We have also
information on the interviewer’s opinion about the race of the respondent (whether she thinks
that the respondent was of Roma origin).10
2.4 Some considerations
Studying time preferences necessarily implies investigating the future. Since the future is inher-
ently uncertain, risk attitudes may be confounded with time preferences. If we do not control
for risk aversion, then we may underestimate the effect of time preferences.11 Importantly, if
risk and time preferences are correlated, then by using only one of them may yield a biased
results. To alleviate this problem, when studying the associations between time preferences and
life outcomes we control for risk preferences.
Another issue to keep in mind is domain specificity. Chapman and Elstein (1995) and Chap-
man (1996) report that individuals have different discount rates for monetary decisions and
health-related decisions. The latter associates with larger discount rates. Weatherly et al. (2010)
also document different discount rates for different domains (including for instance dating part-
ners and cigarettes). However, Hardisty and Weber (2009) find no significant differences in the
10 It is prohibited by law to ask the ethnicity of the respondent.
11 In fact, Leigh (1986) and Anderhub et al. (2001) report a significant negative correlation between individual
discount factors and risk aversion, while Ferecatu and O¨nc¸u¨ler (2016) report the opposite effect. However, Barsky
et al. (1997) document that estimates of time and risk preference are independent. Moreover, Coble and Lusk
(2010) reject the hypothesis that risk, and time preferences are governed by a single parameter and conclude that
the relationship between the two is that individuals prefer to delay the resolution of risk. Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012) also state that while risk and time preferences are intertwined, they are not different manifestations of
the same phenomenon. Epper and Fehr-Duda (2015) show that risk attitudes and time discounting are related
through various channels, for example both risk tolerance and patience are on average higher for payoffs that
materialize in the future compared to payoffs in the present. Green and Myerson (2004) provide evidence that
time and risk preferences are different phenomena. Harrison et al. (2002); Andersen et al. (2008, 2014) argue also
convincingly that risk attitudes should be taken into account when considering time preferences.
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discounting of monetary and environmental outcomes, a result confirmed by Ioannou and Sadeh
(2016). Tsukayama and Duckworth (2010) show that individuals discount more things that they
find more tempting compared to those that are not so appealing to them. We cannot deal with
this issue properly as we could insert in the survey only a restricted number of items and we
opted for choice between monetary flows that is mostly used in the literature.12 A related caveat
concerns present bias. Augenblick et al. (2015), Cohen et al. (2016) and Abdellaoui et al. (2018),
among others suggest that present bias may be more pronounced when considering consumption
instead of monetary flows. Since we use monetary flows, we may underestimate present bias.
The measurement of time preferences generally involves choosing between an earlier and a
later amount of money (see Andreoni et al., 2015; Cohen et al., 2016). If participants choose
on different horizons, then we may calculate individual discount factors and comparing those
individual discount factors may inform about if an individual is present-biased or not. As a
starting point, consider the model of (β, δ)-preferences proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968)
and Laibson (1997).
U t = ut + β
∞∑
s=t+1
δs−tus (1)
where the overall utility U in time t is a function of hyperbolically discounted future utility,
where discount rates decline as we move further away in time. Thus, the near future is discounted
at a higher implicit discount rate than the distant future (Laibson, 1997).
The amount to be received at the later time point in the longer-horizon time preference task
can be seen as a proxy for the indifference point of an individual between receiving a fixed amount
(in our case 10000 Forints) earlier in time t+ s or a larger amount later at time t+ s+ 1 (in our
case, in 12 vs. 13 months). We denote this indifference point by xi,12−13, 12− 13 indicating that
the decision is between an amount in 12 months and an amount in 13 months. Then, indifference
implies
u12(10000) = δ12−13u(xi,12−13) (2)
This indifference point allows us to calculate the individual discount factor on this horizon
(δ12−13) and we interpret it as a proxy for the individual’s patience.
If the same choice is between now and a some later date in the near future (in our case now
vs. 1 month), then we can denote the indifference point by xi,0−1 and the indifference relation
becomes
u0(10000) = βδ0−1u(xi,0−1) (3)
Here, δ0−1 expresses the individual discount factor on the short run, while β represents the
degree of present bias that we will explain below.
3 Descriptive statistics
In this section we investigate two things. First, we present the descriptive statistics of our time and
risk preference measures and see if they correlate. Then, we study how preferences correlate with
individual characteristics to understand what individual aspects are related to the preferences.
12 For risk preferences Weber et al. (2002) document that risk taking depends on the domain that we con-
sider. However, Dohmen et al. (2011) report high correlation in risk taking in these different domains. Moreover,
Crosetto and Filippin (2016) show that domain-specific risk taking is often associated in a significant way with
risk preferences elicited in experiments.
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For time-preferences we follow Meier and Sprenger (2012), and we assume linear utility and
calculate the individual discount factor, that is δ, representing patience as
δ =
10000
xi,12−13
(4)
The higher is the individual discount factor, the more patient an individual is as she discounts
the future more.
Since present bias expresses the idea that individuals are more impatient now, then in the
future, it means that δ12−13 > δ0−1 and the difference is captured by β. Hence, δ0−1 = β ∗δ12−13,
that is
β =
δ0−1
δ12−13
. (5)
Following the idea of Meier and Sprenger (2012) we use a dummy variable for present bias that
takes on the value of 1 if β < 1, and similary if β > 1 we will consider the respondent to be
future-biased. If β = 1 the person is time consistent (our reference category).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics: patience and present bias
Parameter Average (St. Error) Min Max Percentile
5th 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 95th
δ12−13(N = 955) 0.808 (0.160) 0.465 1 0.465 0.541 0.714 0.833 0.952 1 1
β(N = 930) 0.992 (0.185) 0.465 2.15 0.663 0.788 0.943 1 1.023 1.162 1.305
The individual discount rate on the later time horizon (choices between amounts in a year and
in a year and a month, that we call patience) has a median / mean value of 20% / 30.1%, with
a wide range between 0% and 115% (standard deviation: 32.9%).13 The corresponding numbers
of the median and the mean for the earlier time horizon (choices between amounts now and in
a month) are 22.5% and 34.3%. Using the classification of Meier and Sprenger (2012), 35.6% of
our sample is present-biased, 28.1% is future-biased, and the rest (36.3%) is time-consistent. The
share of present-biased individuals is close to those found by Meier and Sprenger (2010) (36%),
Ashraf et al. (2006) (about 27%) and Horn and Kiss (2018) (30%) for non-representative samples
from the US, Phillipines and Hungary. Table 1 is similar in structure to table 3 in Bradford et al.
(2017) and the distributions are comparable.
Our risk measure is the percentage of the endowment that the respondent places as a bet. Our
task is very similar to the one used in Gneezy and Potters (1997). Charness and Gneezy (2012)
review numerous studies that use this task and find that participants tend to invest (bet in our
case) about 50-70% of their endowment. We carried out the same task in a classroom experiment
with university students and they risked on average 48.3% of their endowment (see Horn and
Kiss, 2018). In our current survey individuals on average risked 38.5% of their endowment, which
is somewhat lower than levels found in the literature. This may be due to the fact that in most
of those experiments university students were the participants, who are not representative of the
population.14 Gong and Yang (2012) study villagers in China and they report similarly low (and
even lower) levels using a similar risk elicitation method.
13 Frederick et al. (2002) report a similarly wide range of individual discount rates in their survey.
14 There are studies (e.g. Dohmen et al., 2010, 2018b) that document a positive relation between cognitive
abilities and risk taking. Since arguably university students have higher cognitive abilities than the representative
population, this may explain why we observe a lower level of risk taking. Note also that people under age 40 and
with a tertiary degree risk 54,5% of their endowment in our sample, as well.
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Using pairwise correlation, we find that patience (δ) and our β variable are negatively corre-
lated (r=-0.38), that means that those who are less patient, are more likely to suffer from present
bias in our sample. Note that this finding is somewhat artificial as a higher δ12−13 (our patience
measure) implies that β is smaller conditional on δ0−1. Note, however, as δ12−13 and δ0−1 are
positively but not perfectly correlated (r=0.66), the varience of β is not zero. We also document
a significant and positive correlation (r=0.11) between patience and risk tolerance, suggesting
that more patient individuals in our sample tend to be less risk averse.15 We detect some positive
association between the present-bias variable (β < 1) and risk tolerance, as present-biassed indi-
viduals risk 6% more of their endowments (p-value=0.004) compared to time-consistent people,
but also future-biased individuals (when β > 1) risk 6% more than their time-consistent peers
(p=0.008).
To validate our measures, we briefly consider if we are able to find correlations reported
in the literature in our data. A robust finding in the literature is that women are more risk
averse (see for instance Croson and Gneezy (2009) or Bertrand (2011)).16 We find that women
tend to be aproximately 10% more risk averse, which is a sizable and significant difference, that
holds even if we control for the available individual characteristics. Dohmen et al. (2011) uses a
large, representative German survey and find that older individuals tend to be less risk taking,
a finding that we share.17 Noussair et al. (2013) using Dutch data report that more religious
people are more risk averse. We find the same relationship in our data. Overall, we believe that
our preference measures are meaningful.
4 Results
We present our results using coefficient plots as these show in a clear way if a variable associates
with the outcome of interest or not. The coefficient plots visualize the estimation of the coefficient
with the corresponding standard errors. We relegate the corresponding OLS regression outputs
to section C in the Appendix.
In case of each domain, we estimate various models. In the first model we only add time
preferences (that is, δ and the two dummies related to time inconsistency - present bias (β < 1)
and future bias (β > 1)).18
Then, in later models we add more and more controls. The first control is risk tolerance,
measured by our preference task (ses section 2.1). Then we include a set of variables that we
call exogeneous controls. These include age, age squared, if the respondent is female, and if the
interviewer believes that the respondent is of Roma origin. The next set of control variables that
we call region include dummies for the NUTS2 regions of Hungary and the type of settlement
the respondent lives in.19 The fourth set of control variables are related to family and contains
dummies related to the marital status (single, married, separated, living with partner, widow,
divorced) and the number of children of the respondent. We have also control variables associated
15 As mentioned earlier, Leigh (1986) and Anderhub et al. (2001) reported the same finding, but there are papers
that fail to find such correlation.
16 There are exceptions as for instance Harrison et al. (2007) do not find gender differences in risk aversion in a
representative Danish sample.
17 Findings are varied as Tanaka et al. (2010) reports similar results as we do, however Harrison et al. (2007)
document opposite findings.
18 Note that if we employed only the present bias dummy and did not control for future bias, then we would
compare present bias to time consistency and future bias. We believe that controlling for future bias allows us to
gain a more accurate picture about the effect of present bias.
19 Regarding the regions, we have six dummies for the NUTS3 regions of Hungary, the baseline region being
Central Hungary. We control for settlement type using three dummy variables (town, city, Budapest), the baseline
being village.
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with education including dummies if the respondent has a higher than basic education and if the
respondent has a tertiary education degree. The set of control variables related to income contain
information on the income level, on the wealth level (as detailed earlier in section 2.2.3) and on
financial difficulties (having experienced problems paying utility bills or repaying mortgages or
other outstanding loans, see section 2.2.4). The last set of control variables is related to work and
has information on if the respondent works in the private / public sector and her employment
status (e.g. unemployed, employee, employed, inactive etc.).
The sequence in which we presented our sets of control variables in the previous paragraph
reflects the order as we include them into the regressions. Note that each new regression adds a
new set of control variables to the ones that appeared in the previous regressions. Notice also that
we will leave out the control variables that are directly related to the dependent variable. Thus,
for instance, we do not control for education when we study which variables affect educational
attainment. The coefficient plots visualize the effects at the 10 / 5% significance levels using
thick / thin lines. Section C in the Appendix contains the coefficients and their significance
of the variables of interest. We provide also an online appendix (section E) that contains the
regressions with all the variables.
For the sake of completeness, in the figures we also show the effect of future bias. Not much
is known about future bias, neither theoretically, nor empirically.20 Since there is no relevant
existing literature on future bias, we did not formulate any hypotheses and we will only comment
on its effect when it is noteworthy in our view.
4.1 Educational attainment
Figure 1 shows the effect of time preferences on the probability of obtaining a degree. Patience
(delta) has the expected effect on educational outcome: the more patient a respondent, the
more likely that she has a diploma. Moreover, the effect is marginally significant also when we
control for risk attitudes. However, as we add more control variables, the effect ceases to be
significant. Interestingly, it becomes marginally significant again when adding all the control
variables. Present bias does not have a significant effect in any of the specifications and does not
even show a consistent pattern.
We carry out the same analysis at the other end of the education attainment distribution.
That is, we investigate if time preferences are different for people with at most an elementary
school degree. Interestingly, Figure 2 is not the mirror image of Figure 1, because we see that
patience is not only significant when considering alone or with risk attitudes, but also as we add
other control variables. The level of significance decreases gradually, but even after including
all the control variables, patience is marginally significant at the 10% level. That is, even after
taking into account a wide range of variables the more patient an individual, the less probable
it is that she drops out from education early. The asymmetric effect of patience on educational
outcomes suggests that it has a larger role in escaping low educational attainment than to achieve
a university degree.
The sign of the present bias dummy is also consistently above zero and in some cases it is
even significant. It loses significance when we control for income and work that are ’bad controls’
in the sense that they are highly correlated with educational attainment. This suggests that
present-biased individuals are more likely to end up without a high school degree, in line with
our hypothesis.
Finding 1 (education): Patience seems to be important in escaping low educational attain-
ment even after controlling for a host of variables, but less important when considering attaining
20 A notable exception is Takeuchi (2011).
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Fig. 1: The association of time preference and the probability of obtaining a tertiary degree
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Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 2 in
Appendix C
Fig. 2: The effect of time preference on the probability of failing to obtain a high-school degree
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Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 3 in
Appendix C
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a diploma. Present bias seems to have a consistent positive association with failing to obtain
a higher than elementary degree, but has a rather erratic effect when investigating its role in
obtaining a diploma.
4.2 Unemployment
We hypothesize a positive (negative) relationship between patience (present bias) and being
employed. We exclude from this analysis those individuals who are retired, on maternal leave or
are students, because they are not active on the labour market.
Fig. 3: The association of time preference with the probability of employment
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Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 4 in
Appendix C
Figure 3 shows that being employed is generally negatively correlated with patience and
the effect is often significant after we take into account the risk, exogenous, region and family
controls. Present bias has an insignificant association with being employed. Surprisingly, we not
only do not find any support for our hypotheses related to employment and patience, but we
find the opposite.
We attempted various different specifications informed by the following arguments. One may
argue that some individuals may prefer to be unemployed rather than having a job that they
dislike, so they possibly would wait to have an appealing offer. This may make unemployment
spells longer and actually may make the effect of patience weaker. Since potentially wealthy
or well-off individuals could afford to wait, we excluded them from the analysis and rerun the
regressions for the respondents below the mean / median income. Though the numbers change
somewhat, we see basically the same qualitative pattern. As a further check, we excluded the
self-employed individuals from the analysis, but the results do not change here either.
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4.3 Income and wealth
Based on the literature, we hypothesize a positive correlation between patience and income (and
wealth), and we expect a negative relationship between present bias and income (and wealth).
Fig. 4: The association of time preference with income
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Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 5 in
Appendix C
We do not observe strong associations between time preferences and income. There is a
marginal positive effect of patience (as expected) when omitting other variables, but the effect
disappears as control variables are included in the regressions. Similarly, the effect of present bias
is not significantly different from zero in any specification.
The effect of patience on wealth is in line with our expectations. We see a significant positive
effect when considered alone or even when we control for risk attitude. The effect remains strong
after controlling for age, gender and ethnicity and becomes marginally significant if we add
regional and settlement type dummies. If we add more control variables on education and work,
the effect ceases to be significant. However, these latter two, again, are probably bad controls as
they directly impact wealth. Having this in mind, we would argue that patience could be a strong
predictor of wealth. Present bias always has a negative sign as expected, and is also significant
if we take risk, exogenous, region and family into account. This, however, also indicates that
present-biassed individuals tend to accumulate less wealth over their life.
Finding 3 (income and wealth): Patience has mostly a positive, but generally insignifi-
cant association with income. For wealth the positive association is much more straithforward
and significant in many specifications. The effect of present bias is almost always negative on
both income and wealth (as expected), but this effect is significant only marginally in some
specifications, and mainly for wealth.
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Fig. 5: The association of time preference with wealth
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Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 6 in
Appendix C
4.4 Financial decisions and financial difficulties
4.4.1 Banking and saving decisions
Based on the literature, we expect that more patient individuals tend to i) use more the basic
banking services, ii) save more. Regarding present bias, we expect to see the opposite associations.
In line with our hypotheses, we observe a steady positive association of patience with banking
decisions in Figure 6. The significance subsides somewhat as we add more and more controls, but
the effect remains at least marginally significant even after including all controls. The present
bias dummy has a significant and positive effect on banking decisions in the first regressions. This
positive effect is not in line with our expectations.21 When looking at the individual components
of the index, in the case of having a bank account, patience does not play a significant role,
present bias shows a significant and positive effect (in contrast to our conjecture) in the first
regressions, but not after controlling for region. Concerning banking card, patience exhibits a
consistent positive effect that is significant without controls, but the significance disappears after
controlling for exogenous factors. Present bias also has an unexpected consistent positive effect
that is marginally significant without controls and when only risk tolerance is included as control.
For details, see Tables 12 and 13 in section D of the Appendix.
When investigating saving decisions, in line with our hypotheses patience has a significant
positive effect, even if we include as controls all the variables that we have information about.
Present bias also has the expected negative effect and it is significant even if we control for risk
21 A potential explanation is that if an individual is aware of suffering from present bias, then she may use
commitment devices to deal with this problem (e.g. Ashraf et al., 2006). Our data does not allow to check if this
is the case here.
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Fig. 6: The association of time preference with banking decisions
0
.
5
1
1.
5
delta present−biased, dummy future−biased, dummy
none risk
+exogeneous +region
+family +educ
+income +work
Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 7 in
Appendix C
Fig. 7: The association of time preference with saving decisions
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Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 8 in
Appendix C
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attitude, exogenous variables and region. When considering separately the components of the
saving index, then we find that patience has a consistent and positive effect on the ownership of
stocks that is significant at least at 10% throughout the regressions. Hence, more patient individ-
uals are more likely to own stocks. The effect of present bias is also in line with the expectations,
that is, present-biased individuals are less likely to own stocks. This effect is significant in all,
but the last specifications. When turning to retirement savings, a similar but stronger pattern
emerges. Patience shows a very strong positive effect throughout the regressions. Even if we
control for all the variables, its effect is still significant at the 1%. Present bias has the expected
negative effect and it is at least marginally significant in almost all specifications. Considering
having a life insurance, patience has a consistent positive effect (as expected) that proves to
be significant in all regressions. However, present bias does not seem to play a role as it is not
significant in any specification. For details, see Tables 14, 15 and 16 in section D of the Appendix.
Finding 4 (financial decisions): Regarding banking decisions, patience has a consistent
positive and significant association with the outcome, while present bias does not seem to play a
role. When considering separately the components of banking decisions, having a bank account
is not affected by patience and is positively influenced by present bias, the influence being sig-
nificant only when at most exogeneous variables are considered. Concerning having a bank card,
patience has a consistent positive association that is significant when some control variables are
added. Present bias is negatively associated with having a bank card, and the effect is significant
only without controls and when we add risk attitudes, with more controls it ceases to be sig-
nificant. Patience exerts a very strong positive and significant association with having savings.
The association is strongest for retirement savings, followed by life insurance and owning stocks.
We also observe that present-biased individuals are less likely to have savings, in general. This
pattern is observed for stock ownership and retirement savings, but is absent in the case of life
insurance.
4.4.2 Financial troubles
According to Figure 8 patience is not associated with financial troubles in our sample. The sign
of the coefficient is consistently negative, suggesting that more patient individuals are less likely
to suffer financial distress, but it has no significant effect in any of the specifications. However,
present-biased individuals tend to have more financial troubles. The coefficient of the present bias
dummy is statistically significant in all specifications. The results show that being present-biased
relative to time-consistent increases the likelihood of suffering financial troubles by 16-18%. This
result is very similar to that found by Meier and Sprenger (2010) who study credit card borrowing
and find that individual discount factors do not explain credit card debt, while present bias does.
Finding 5 (financial troubles): Patience associates in a consistently negative manner with
the occurrence of financial troubles (as expected), however the association fails to be signifi-
cant. Present bias has the expected positive effect on financial troubles, moreover this effect is
significant even if we add all the control variables.
4.5 Health
Following Bradford et al. (2017), we form two dummy variables based on the answers given to the
self-reported health question in the survey. If the respondent chooses one of the two categories
that report an inferior health, then we say that the individual has bad health. Similarly, we
construct a dummy variable standing for good health. Based on the literature, we expect a
positive (negative) relationship between patience (present bias) and self-reported good health.
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Fig. 8: The association of time preferences with financial troubles
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Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 9 in
Appendix C
In Figure 9 we do not see any association of patience or present bias with bad health. Pa-
tience seems to have a generally negative association (as expected), but fails to be significant.
The association of present bias is consistently negative (contrary to our expectations) and not
significant in any of the specifications.22
Figure 10 indicates that without control variables, patience associates significantly and posi-
tively with good health, as expected. The significance goes away as we add control variables, but
reassuringly we see that the coefficient has a consistent positive sign. Present bias does not have
a significant effect.
Finding 6 (health): We find weak evidence that more patient individuals are more likely
to enjoy good health, but we fail to document any significant effect of patience on bad health or
any influence of present bias on self-reported health.
5 Discussion
In this study we investigated the association between two aspects of time preferences (patience
and present bias) and life outcomes in five domains. Patience has the expected effect in most of
the cases in terms of exhibiting consistently the expected sign and being significant in at least
some specifications. The associations are the strongest with escaping low educational attainment,
wealth, banking and saving decisions and financial troubles. Only in the case of unemployment
we observe unexpected signs.
22 Interestingly, being future-biased is significantly correlated with bad health in some specifications especially
without controls: future-biased individuals are less likely to suffer bad health.
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Fig. 9: The association of time preference with having bad health
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Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 10 in
Appendix C
Fig. 10: The effect of time preference on having good health
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Note: Coefficient plots of the variables of interest. Coefficients with 10 / 5% significance levels, from Table 11 in
Appendix C
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Present bias seems to be less important, as it has low to no association with many outcomes.
It has the expected sign and is signifcant in at least some specifications only when considering
escaping the low educational outcome, banking and saving decisions, and financial troubles.
There are at least two potential explanations why the effect of present bias is less pronounced
than that of patience. First, if an individual is aware that she suffers from present bias, then she
may use commitment devices (e.g. Bryan et al., 2010) to overcome her problem as we already
pointed out in the case of banking decisions. We cannot observe the use of commitment devices,
so in principle we cannot discard their effect. However, we could not come up with a good
story why commitment devices help in the areas where we do not see an effect of present bias,
but not in the other domains. Further studies should investigate, for instance, if commitment
devices in financial services and issues could dampen the negative effect of present bias. Second,
Augenblick et al. (2015) - among others - argue that present bias may be more marked in case
of consumption goods than for monetary flows. We do not consider real consumption goods and
actually we observe that present bias has some effect in issues involving money (banking, saving
and financial difficulties), so this explanation seems to have no importance in our case.
We consider a strength of our study that it uses a representative sample that allows us to draw
firmer conclusions about the effect of time preferences on life outcomes. More such representative
samples with more respondents under different elicitation methods and incentive schemes would
be welcome so that we obtain a more robust knowledge on how patience and time inconsistency
associate with relevant outcomes in life. Given a more conclusive knowledge we will able to come
up with adequate policy interventions. Some steps have been made in that direction already. In
line with the early childhood intervention literature (see for instance Zigler, 2000; Elango et al.,
2015), Alan and Ertac (2018) design an intervention to foster patience. The intervention indeed
leads to more patient intertemporal choices in case of the treated students and has a persistent
positive effect on school performance. Our study (and others in this literature) suggest that such
interventions may have effect in other domains as well.
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A Survey questions
1. During the next questions we will play a short game. You have to choose between two amounts of money.
Not only are the amounts different, they also differ in when you would receive them. Please assume there is no
inflation, i.e., future prices are the same as today’s prices. This situation is hypothetical, but please answer as if
it was a real choice.
1.a. Would you rather receive 10000 Forints today or X1 in a month?
1 – 10,000 Ft today, or
2 – X1 Ft in a month?
9 – Do not know
(And 4 other questions of this sort followed.)
2. Please assume that you receive 10000 Forints and you have the opportunity to place a bet (between 0 and
10000 Ft) on a colour in the next gamble. There is a bag that contains 10 black and 10 red balls. We will draw
one. If the colour of the ball drawn coincides with your bet, then we double the amount of your bet. If not, the
your bet is lost. The amount not placed as bet is yours.
Please, select a colour!
2.a Selected colour:
2.b. How much would you bet?
Amount of the bet:
3. Now I will ask similar questions as before, but there is a difference. You would receive the earlier payoff
in a year, and the later payoff in a year and a month. How would you choose?
3.a. Would you rather receive 10000 Forints in a year or X1 in a year and a month?
1 – 10,000 Ft today, or
2 – X1 Ft in a month?
9 – DK
(And 4 other questions of this sort followed.)
B Staircase method to measure time preferences and individual discount rates
Figure 11 represents the tree behind the staircase method. The first question asked if the individual preferred
10000 Forints today or 15500 Forints in a month. If the individual chose the former / latter one, then it revealed
that the amount of money in a month that makes her indifferent to 10000 Forints today is more / less than 15500
Forints, so the next question asked if she preferred 10000 Forints today or 18500 / 12500 Forints in a month. This
algorithm was repeated in all the 5 questions.
The answers to these 5 interdependent questions allows us to zoom in on the indifference point, but note that
we cannot infer the the exact amount that makes the individual indifferent. However, we know lower and upper
bounds of the real indifference point.
In Figure 12 we show the patience scores and the corresponding upper and lower bounds of the indifference
point.
By considering the midpoint of the bounds, we can compute the individual discount rate (IDR). If we denote
the midpoint by X, then
(1 + IDR) ∗ 10000 = X, (6)
and therefore
IDR = (X/10000) − 1. (7)
The last column in Figure 12 contains the corresponding individual discount rates.
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Fig. 11: Tree for the staircase time preference task
28 Da´niel Horn, Hubert Ja´nos Kiss
Fig. 12: Patience scores, the corresponding upper and lower bounds of the indifference point and
the implied individual discount rates
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C Regression tables
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Table 2: The association of time preference with the probability of obtaining a tertiary degree, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES high education level high education level high education level high education level high education level high education level high education level
delta 0.207** 0.194* 0.162 0.140 0.157 0.137 0.124
(0.0962) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0988) (0.0967) (0.0916) (0.0763)
present-biased, dummy -0.0100 -0.0195 -0.0269 -0.0150 -0.00969 0.00638 0.0201
(0.0333) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0329) (0.0298)
future-biased, dummy 0.0358 0.0394 0.0290 0.0192 0.0204 0.00708 0.00997
(0.0378) (0.0401) (0.0396) (0.0390) (0.0385) (0.0357) (0.0327)
Constant 0.000499 -0.0136 -0.288** -0.400*** -0.402*** -0.485*** 0.172
(0.0796) (0.0823) (0.126) (0.123) (0.139) (0.134) (0.184)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.008 0.014 0.039 0.090 0.104 0.220 0.345
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3: The association of time preference with the probability of failing to obtain a high-school degree, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES low education level low education level low education level low education level low education level low education level low education level
delta -0.396*** -0.337*** -0.244** -0.246** -0.248** -0.208* -0.191*
(0.113) (0.118) (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.110) (0.105)
present-biased, dummy 0.0511 0.0484 0.0669 0.0681 0.0756* 0.0488 0.0420
(0.0415) (0.0429) (0.0420) (0.0418) (0.0423) (0.0404) (0.0391)
future-biased, dummy -0.0386 -0.0234 0.00154 0.0331 0.0410 0.0532 0.0577
(0.0459) (0.0474) (0.0460) (0.0464) (0.0467) (0.0442) (0.0439)
Constant 0.821*** 0.818*** 0.788*** 0.854*** 0.755*** 0.654* 0.0848
(0.0981) (0.101) (0.192) (0.205) (0.221) (0.391) (0.386)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.018 0.021 0.094 0.165 0.184 0.287 0.326
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: The association of time preference with the probability employment, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES R has a job R has a job R has a job R has a job R has a job R has a job R has a job
delta 0.0117 -0.0777 -0.120 -0.133 -0.165* -0.175** -0.155*
(0.113) (0.115) (0.0835) (0.0844) (0.0854) (0.0862) (0.0807)
present-biased, dummy 0.0148 -0.00539 -0.0489 -0.0316 -0.0420 -0.0391 -0.0381
(0.0413) (0.0424) (0.0334) (0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0318)
future-biased, dummy 0.0683 0.0515 0.0220 0.0261 0.0174 0.0190 0.00106
(0.0449) (0.0460) (0.0371) (0.0366) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0336)
Constant 0.579*** 0.588*** 0.00850 -0.0454 -0.0463 -0.0180 -0.700***
(0.0977) (0.0990) (0.183) (0.193) (0.206) (0.208) (0.201)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.003 0.018 0.391 0.405 0.428 0.430 0.514
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: The association of time preference with income, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES income income income income income income income
delta 25,611* 16,222 5,156 -110.6 3,039 -14,834 -7,315
(15,464) (15,564) (14,009) (14,103) (14,336) (12,541) (10,877)
present-biased, dummy -4,528 -7,264 -9,571* -5,259 -5,871 -2,400 -1,593
(5,736) (5,777) (5,507) (5,482) (5,525) (5,016) (4,386)
future-biased, dummy 5,115 4,633 3,140 4,715 5,467 4,884 2,057
(6,367) (6,378) (5,813) (5,909) (5,831) (5,261) (4,689)
Constant 106,805*** 98,571*** 93,172*** 96,526*** 101,026*** 131,593*** 175,934***
(13,228) (13,231) (25,408) (26,212) (26,657) (22,997) (22,516)
Observations 681 651 651 651 651 651 651
R2 0.007 0.067 0.179 0.231 0.245 0.373 0.509
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: The association of time preference with wealth, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index
delta 0.593*** 0.539*** 0.375** 0.299* 0.239 0.117 0.124
(0.165) (0.173) (0.165) (0.161) (0.156) (0.151) (0.149)
present-biased, dummy -0.0586 -0.0755 -0.100* -0.0832 -0.104* -0.0762 -0.0763
(0.0589) (0.0603) (0.0578) (0.0582) (0.0551) (0.0520) (0.0515)
future-biased, dummy 0.121* 0.109 0.0689 0.0596 0.0320 0.0411 0.0395
(0.0667) (0.0703) (0.0669) (0.0663) (0.0606) (0.0561) (0.0555)
Constant -0.504*** -0.504*** -0.820*** -0.823*** -0.370 -0.0160 0.0365
(0.141) (0.149) (0.245) (0.254) (0.254) (0.250) (0.281)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.022 0.025 0.126 0.163 0.260 0.345 0.371
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 7: The association of time preference with banking decisions, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions
VARIABLES bank bank bank bank bank bank bank bank
delta 0.756*** 0.623*** 0.460** 0.468** 0.385* 0.286 0.291 0.318
(0.221) (0.231) (0.208) (0.214) (0.206) (0.203) (0.195) (0.195)
present-biased, dummy 0.128* 0.116 0.0568 0.0390 0.0162 0.0400 0.0549 0.0584
(0.0708) (0.0717) (0.0631) (0.0645) (0.0636) (0.0612) (0.0610) (0.0603)
future-biased, dummy 0.107 0.0901 0.0323 0.0242 0.0303 0.0389 0.0148 0.0207
(0.0855) (0.0872) (0.0766) (0.0776) (0.0758) (0.0735) (0.0742) (0.0723)
Constant -0.680*** -0.694*** -1.391*** -1.339*** -0.944*** -0.656** -0.796** -0.563
(0.195) (0.202) (0.269) (0.279) (0.306) (0.314) (0.388) (0.498)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.022 0.034 0.239 0.253 0.294 0.331 0.380 0.403
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: The association of time preference with savings decisions, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions
VARIABLES saving saving saving saving saving saving saving saving
delta 0.599*** 0.549*** 0.551*** 0.445*** 0.475*** 0.433*** 0.409*** 0.403**
(0.167) (0.173) (0.172) (0.167) (0.161) (0.161) (0.157) (0.157)
present-biased, dummy -0.129** -0.145** -0.141** -0.119** -0.0908 -0.0884 -0.0598 -0.0526
(0.0558) (0.0579) (0.0586) (0.0585) (0.0581) (0.0575) (0.0545) (0.0552)
future-biased, dummy 0.0163 -0.00899 -0.00659 -0.0143 -0.00682 -0.0124 -0.00569 0.00562
(0.0687) (0.0719) (0.0717) (0.0698) (0.0679) (0.0670) (0.0656) (0.0658)
Constant -0.420*** -0.401*** -0.512** -0.594** -0.731*** -0.625** 0.0235 -0.343
(0.139) (0.145) (0.242) (0.260) (0.263) (0.267) (0.478) (0.473)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.061 0.085 0.106 0.195 0.216
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 9: The association of time preference with financial troubles, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties
VARIABLES index index index index index index index index
delta -0.258 -0.234 -0.124 -0.195 -0.172 -0.123 -0.122 -0.116
(0.190) (0.208) (0.187) (0.191) (0.185) (0.181) (0.181) (0.184)
present-biased, dummy 0.154** 0.172** 0.170** 0.163** 0.179** 0.169** 0.167** 0.157**
(0.0738) (0.0778) (0.0747) (0.0728) (0.0737) (0.0710) (0.0696) (0.0699)
future-biased, dummy -0.0467 -0.0552 -0.0375 -0.0601 -0.0365 -0.0389 -0.0199 -0.0170
(0.0599) (0.0643) (0.0607) (0.0600) (0.0621) (0.0608) (0.0618) (0.0633)
Constant 0.191 0.176 0.511 0.463 0.529 0.389 2.029 1.986
(0.165) (0.168) (0.447) (0.430) (0.459) (0.438) (1.329) (1.432)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.013 0.015 0.071 0.089 0.108 0.119 0.158 0.167
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: The association of time preference with having bad health, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES health bad health bad health bad health bad health bad health bad health bad health bad
delta -0.0813 -0.0518 -0.00861 -0.0172 0.00404 0.0127 -0.00189 0.00794
(0.0712) (0.0722) (0.0689) (0.0697) (0.0685) (0.0690) (0.0654) (0.0640)
present-biased, dummy -0.0264 -0.0235 -0.0130 -0.00270 0.00307 0.00113 0.00202 0.00331
(0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0229) (0.0237) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0227) (0.0228)
future-biased, dummy -0.0576** -0.0560** -0.0455* -0.0350 -0.0339 -0.0345 -0.0154 -0.0112
(0.0268) (0.0260) (0.0249) (0.0257) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0230) (0.0229)
Constant 0.186*** 0.182*** -0.0963 -0.213** -0.332*** -0.357*** -0.0418 -0.00339
(0.0649) (0.0648) (0.0923) (0.102) (0.111) (0.114) (0.227) (0.250)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.007 0.013 0.110 0.135 0.176 0.179 0.264 0.283
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 11: The association of time preference with having good health, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES health good health good health good health good health good health good health good health good
delta 0.275** 0.176 0.0913 0.0983 0.0719 0.0405 0.0833 0.0886
(0.111) (0.113) (0.0988) (0.0998) (0.100) (0.0996) (0.101) (0.0999)
present-biased, dummy 0.00836 -0.0118 -0.0429 -0.0412 -0.0440 -0.0365 -0.0345 -0.0348
(0.0397) (0.0405) (0.0339) (0.0345) (0.0338) (0.0336) (0.0334) (0.0339)
future-biased, dummy 0.0554 0.0413 0.0152 0.0185 0.0150 0.0176 0.00970 0.0127
(0.0439) (0.0443) (0.0381) (0.0391) (0.0388) (0.0383) (0.0377) (0.0376)
Constant 0.388*** 0.384*** 1.113*** 1.007*** 1.141*** 1.232*** 0.912*** 0.782***
(0.0973) (0.0979) (0.133) (0.146) (0.158) (0.157) (0.238) (0.272)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.009 0.033 0.294 0.304 0.330 0.342 0.388 0.406
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12: The association of time preference with the probability of having a bank account, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES R has bank account R has bank account R has bank account R has bank account R has bank account R has bank account R has bank account R has bank account
delta 0.147 0.103 0.0438 0.0669 0.0383 -0.00694 0.00347 0.0138
(0.0956) (0.0991) (0.0889) (0.0919) (0.0891) (0.0872) (0.0861) (0.0863)
present-biased, dummy 0.0799** 0.0764** 0.0546* 0.0397 0.0267 0.0388 0.0377 0.0374
(0.0320) (0.0325) (0.0296) (0.0301) (0.0301) (0.0298) (0.0304) (0.0299)
future-biased, dummy 0.0693* 0.0661* 0.0450 0.0440 0.0436 0.0483 0.0409 0.0412
(0.0361) (0.0368) (0.0336) (0.0344) (0.0335) (0.0325) (0.0333) (0.0327)
Constant 0.659*** 0.645*** 0.315** 0.332** 0.504*** 0.609*** 0.250 0.416
(0.0845) (0.0875) (0.131) (0.138) (0.147) (0.148) (0.253) (0.317)
Observations 916 865 865 865 865 865 865 865
R2 0.012 0.025 0.182 0.205 0.245 0.276 0.302 0.327
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 13: The association of time preference with the probability of having a banking card, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES R has a credit card R has a credit card R has a credit card R has a credit card R has a credit card R has a credit card R has a credit card R has a credit card
delta 0.265*** 0.223** 0.157 0.171* 0.130 0.1000 0.102 0.117
(0.0972) (0.102) (0.0963) (0.0990) (0.0918) (0.0925) (0.0901) (0.0906)
present-biased, dummy 0.0576* 0.0552* 0.0318 0.0242 0.0141 0.0228 0.0266 0.0277
(0.0300) (0.0304) (0.0270) (0.0278) (0.0272) (0.0267) (0.0272) (0.0268)
future-biased, dummy 0.0197 0.0154 -0.00700 -0.0120 -0.00943 -0.00496 -0.0130 -0.00954
(0.0358) (0.0369) (0.0332) (0.0338) (0.0333) (0.0329) (0.0333) (0.0326)
Constant 0.594*** 0.587*** 0.455*** 0.521*** 0.664*** 0.736*** 0.767*** 0.867***
(0.0858) (0.0890) (0.119) (0.124) (0.136) (0.142) (0.158) (0.175)
Observations 915 864 864 864 864 864 864 864
R2 0.019 0.026 0.207 0.224 0.275 0.291 0.319 0.342
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14: The association of time preference with the probability of owning stocks, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES R owns stock/share R owns stock/share R owns stock/share R owns stock/share R owns stock/share R owns stock/share R owns stock/share R owns stock/share
delta 0.0987** 0.0938* 0.0903* 0.0880* 0.0903** 0.0766* 0.0659* 0.0680*
(0.0499) (0.0532) (0.0531) (0.0498) (0.0450) (0.0421) (0.0394) (0.0377)
present-biased, dummy -0.0273** -0.0300** -0.0315** -0.0321** -0.0246** -0.0237** -0.0208* -0.0178
(0.0119) (0.0129) (0.0133) (0.0131) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0110) (0.0109)
future-biased, dummy 0.0312 0.0317 0.0307 0.0238 0.0290 0.0268 0.0254 0.0290
(0.0215) (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0223) (0.0209) (0.0203) (0.0190) (0.0187)
Constant -0.0504 -0.0594 -0.0791 -0.0680 -0.0281 -0.00215 0.00276 -0.00597
(0.0375) (0.0393) (0.0583) (0.0676) (0.0675) (0.0664) (0.0777) (0.0970)
Observations 908 857 857 857 857 857 857 857
R2 0.022 0.029 0.037 0.054 0.098 0.125 0.222 0.255
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 15: The association of time preference with the probability of having retirement savings, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES R has retirement savings R has retirement savings R has retirement savings R has retirement savings R has retirement savings R has retirement savings R has retirement savings R has retirement savings
delta 0.345*** 0.276*** 0.255*** 0.219*** 0.219*** 0.191*** 0.192*** 0.195***
(0.0737) (0.0734) (0.0720) (0.0720) (0.0722) (0.0714) (0.0704) (0.0717)
present-biased, dummy -0.0483* -0.0591** -0.0684** -0.0640** -0.0579** -0.0517* -0.0453* -0.0422
(0.0272) (0.0276) (0.0275) (0.0280) (0.0283) (0.0280) (0.0274) (0.0275)
future-biased, dummy 0.000381 -0.0200 -0.0280 -0.0325 -0.0311 -0.0299 -0.0246 -0.0207
(0.0318) (0.0320) (0.0312) (0.0314) (0.0315) (0.0310) (0.0314) (0.0315)
Constant -0.137** -0.126** -0.345*** -0.334*** -0.343*** -0.280** 0.0244 -0.0937
(0.0589) (0.0602) (0.103) (0.117) (0.118) (0.121) (0.286) (0.282)
Observations 912 862 862 862 862 862 862 862
R2 0.031 0.042 0.085 0.097 0.107 0.124 0.173 0.187
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16: The association of time preference with the probability of having a life insurance, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES R has life insurance R has life insurance R has life insurance R has life insurance R has life insurance R has life insurance R has life insurance R has life insurance
delta 0.444*** 0.429*** 0.381*** 0.315*** 0.299*** 0.241** 0.247** 0.249**
(0.102) (0.106) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.100) (0.102)
present-biased, dummy 0.0203 0.0136 0.00312 0.0134 0.0144 0.0248 0.0484 0.0501
(0.0396) (0.0410) (0.0410) (0.0421) (0.0422) (0.0403) (0.0370) (0.0378)
future-biased, dummy 0.0344 0.0232 0.0103 0.0134 0.0158 0.0152 -0.000194 0.00215
(0.0429) (0.0445) (0.0435) (0.0439) (0.0433) (0.0431) (0.0416) (0.0427)
Constant -0.0763 -0.0730 -0.244 -0.378** -0.368* -0.241 -0.00698 -0.0303
(0.0883) (0.0924) (0.175) (0.187) (0.197) (0.195) (0.247) (0.262)
Observations 914 863 863 863 863 863 863 863
R2 0.024 0.024 0.058 0.080 0.098 0.136 0.274 0.276
additional controls: none risk +exogenous +region +family +educ +income +work
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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This section contains the complete regression outputs of the different specifications.
The female dummy captures the difference between females and males. Age and age2 indicates the effects
related to age. Roma is a dummy with value of 1 if the interviewer believes that the respondent is of Roma origin.
These variables are called exogeneous.
The next set of variables are termed region. These include six dummies for the NUTS2 regions of Hungary,
the baseline region being Central Hungary. Settlement type also belongs to this set of variables. It contains 3
dummy variables (town, city, Budapest), the baseline being village.
The set of variables called family has two components: marital status and number of children. Marital status
is a set of dummy variables (married, separated, living with partner, widow, divorced), the baseline variable being
single. We also account for the fact if marital status is missing. Using dummy variables we also take into account
the number of children, the baseline being if the respondent has no children.
The control for education uses two dummy variables: the dummy low education level equals 1 if the maximum
educational attainment of the respondent is having finished only the primary school. On the contrary, the binary
variable high education level takes on the value of 1 if the respondent has at least a tertiary degree.
The next set of control variables termed income attempts to give a fair picture about the respondent’s financial
situation. Therefore, it considers the income and the wealth (using an index based on wealth items and durables
that the respondent possesses, see section 2.2.3), also allowing for the fact if some of these informations are missing.
Moreover, we form also a financial difficulties index that indicates if in the preceding year the respondent had
any problem paying utility bills or outstanding loans.
Regarding employment, first we consider if the respondent works in the public sector or not. We also take into
account the employment status of the respondent by using dummies (employee, unemployed, retired, inactive,
student, other), the baseline being self-employed.
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Table 17: The association of time preference with the probability of obtaining a tertiary degree,
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES high education level high education level high education level high education level high education level high education level high education level
delta 0.207** 0.194* 0.162 0.140 0.157 0.137 0.124
(0.0962) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0988) (0.0967) (0.0916) (0.0763)
present-biased, dummy -0.0100 -0.0195 -0.0269 -0.0150 -0.00969 0.00638 0.0201
(0.0333) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0348) (0.0347) (0.0329) (0.0298)
future-biased, dummy 0.0358 0.0394 0.0290 0.0192 0.0204 0.00708 0.00997
(0.0378) (0.0401) (0.0396) (0.0390) (0.0385) (0.0357) (0.0327)
risk % 0.000760 0.000729 0.000628 0.000540 0.000125 -4.23e-05
(0.000495) (0.000487) (0.000499) (0.000484) (0.000443) (0.000400)
age 0.0147*** 0.0143*** 0.0149*** 0.0124** 0.00927*
(0.00392) (0.00395) (0.00523) (0.00533) (0.00533)
age2 -0.000158*** -0.000151*** -0.000156*** -0.000117** -0.000105**
(3.79e-05) (3.81e-05) (5.08e-05) (5.10e-05) (5.04e-05)
female 0.0338 0.0391 0.0381 0.0575* 0.0115
(0.0305) (0.0298) (0.0300) (0.0296) (0.0269)
roma -0.173*** -0.162*** -0.160*** -0.0133 -0.0469
(0.0220) (0.0250) (0.0279) (0.0339) (0.0345)
region==Central Transdanubia 0.0654 0.0598 0.0542 0.0253
(0.0508) (0.0536) (0.0568) (0.0450)
region==Western Transdanubia -0.0246 -0.0329 -0.0351 -0.0757*
(0.0521) (0.0537) (0.0480) (0.0428)
region==Southern Transdanubia 0.0778 0.0697 0.0644 0.00672
(0.0602) (0.0624) (0.0595) (0.0485)
region==Northern Hungary 0.0764* 0.0594 0.0778 0.0388
(0.0441) (0.0451) (0.0473) (0.0406)
region==Northern Great Plain 0.0419 0.0286 0.0632 0.00760
(0.0456) (0.0453) (0.0479) (0.0410)
region==Southern Great Plain 0.0742 0.0555 0.0998* 0.0511
(0.0514) (0.0530) (0.0531) (0.0480)
stype==town 0.0515* 0.0523* 0.0475* 0.0389
(0.0299) (0.0303) (0.0288) (0.0244)
stype==city 0.134*** 0.128*** 0.105** 0.0600
(0.0478) (0.0470) (0.0449) (0.0427)
stype==Budapest 0.274*** 0.269*** 0.223*** 0.163***
(0.0567) (0.0569) (0.0560) (0.0517)
Married -0.0164 -0.0441 -0.0542
(0.0544) (0.0534) (0.0485)
Separated 0.243 0.212 0.113
(0.149) (0.152) (0.134)
Living w/ partner -0.0416 -0.0276 -0.0405
(0.0552) (0.0550) (0.0530)
Widow -0.0277 -0.00782 -0.0543
(0.0751) (0.0700) (0.0588)
Divorced -0.0305 -0.0282 -0.0259
(0.0583) (0.0566) (0.0530)
Marital status missing 0.122 0.0425 0.0972
(0.257) (0.127) (0.175)
Nr. children: 1 -0.0314 -0.0567 -0.0398
(0.0484) (0.0475) (0.0466)
Nr. children: 2 0.00150 -0.0259 -0.0168
(0.0528) (0.0512) (0.0475)
Nr. children: 3 -0.000867 -0.00606 0.00403
(0.0616) (0.0642) (0.0606)
Nr. children: 4 0.129 0.132 0.0855
(0.106) (0.106) (0.120)
Nr. children: 5+ -0.0164 -0.0133 -0.0560
(0.0758) (0.0662) (0.0675)
21.000 HUF < income < 40.000 HUF 0.0122 -0.0716
(0.0653) (0.0869)
41.000 HUF < income < 70.000 HUF 0.0713 -0.0274
(0.0684) (0.0928)
71.000 HUF < income < 100.000 HUF 0.0553 -0.00612
(0.0671) (0.0889)
101.000 HUF < income < 150.000 HUF 0.0882 0.0157
(0.0649) (0.0905)
151.000 HUF < income < 200.000 HUF 0.156** 0.0591
(0.0739) (0.0978)
201.000 HUF < income < 300.000 HUF 0.471*** 0.351***
(0.0959) (0.114)
301.000 HUF < income < 500.000 HUF 0.364* 0.174
(0.221) (0.196)
income, missing 0.180*** 0.108
(0.0645) (0.0865)
wealth index 0.0953*** 0.0817***
(0.0266) (0.0256)
wealth, missing 0.0463 0.0338
(0.0803) (0.0690)
financial difficulties, index -0.0166 -0.0110
(0.0119) (0.0111)
financial difficulties, missing = o, - -
Works for public company -0.301***
(0.0711)
Other -0.468***
(0.0657)
public servant, missing -0.301**
(0.145)
Employee 0.237***
(0.0775)
Unemployed 0.0683
(0.0543)
Retired 0.0777*
(0.0462)
Inactive 0.0978
(0.0792)
Student -0.259*
(0.140)
Other -0.187*
(0.111)
Constant 0.000499 -0.0136 -0.288** -0.400*** -0.402*** -0.485*** 0.172
(0.0796) (0.0823) (0.126) (0.123) (0.139) (0.134) (0.184)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.008 0.014 0.039 0.090 0.104 0.220 0.345
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18: The association of time preference with the probability of failing to obtain a high-school
degree, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES low education level low education level low education level low education level low education level low education level low education level
delta -0.396*** -0.337*** -0.244** -0.246** -0.248** -0.208* -0.191*
(0.113) (0.118) (0.115) (0.116) (0.115) (0.110) (0.105)
present-biased, dummy 0.0511 0.0484 0.0669 0.0681 0.0756* 0.0488 0.0420
(0.0415) (0.0429) (0.0420) (0.0418) (0.0423) (0.0404) (0.0391)
future-biased, dummy -0.0386 -0.0234 0.00154 0.0331 0.0410 0.0532 0.0577
(0.0459) (0.0474) (0.0460) (0.0464) (0.0467) (0.0442) (0.0439)
risk % -0.00119** -0.000936 -0.000671 -0.000637 -0.000172 -0.000107
(0.000580) (0.000569) (0.000579) (0.000570) (0.000535) (0.000525)
age -0.00919 -0.00624 -0.00128 0.000839 0.00491
(0.00646) (0.00641) (0.00759) (0.00736) (0.00749)
age2 0.000155** 0.000123** 6.20e-05 2.44e-05 -3.73e-06
(6.20e-05) (6.07e-05) (7.20e-05) (6.97e-05) (7.16e-05)
female -0.0839** -0.0869** -0.0962*** -0.115*** -0.0874**
(0.0361) (0.0352) (0.0364) (0.0355) (0.0350)
roma 0.375*** 0.359*** 0.328*** 0.111** 0.129**
(0.0552) (0.0527) (0.0540) (0.0546) (0.0532)
region==Central Transdanubia 0.0733 0.0593 0.0825 0.0963
(0.0758) (0.0779) (0.0816) (0.0746)
region==Western Transdanubia 0.0612 0.0877 0.0943 0.116
(0.0804) (0.0814) (0.0778) (0.0751)
region==Southern Transdanubia -0.0662 -0.0653 -0.0583 -0.0288
(0.0798) (0.0801) (0.0780) (0.0765)
region==Northern Hungary -0.0175 -0.0208 -0.0281 -0.00332
(0.0716) (0.0737) (0.0721) (0.0704)
region==Northern Great Plain 0.0532 0.0433 0.00368 0.0320
(0.0691) (0.0702) (0.0716) (0.0689)
region==Southern Great Plain 0.0317 0.0152 -0.00750 0.0247
(0.0714) (0.0733) (0.0720) (0.0710)
stype==town -0.171*** -0.158*** -0.147*** -0.141***
(0.0414) (0.0422) (0.0398) (0.0384)
stype==city -0.239*** -0.219*** -0.175*** -0.139***
(0.0555) (0.0553) (0.0531) (0.0518)
stype==Budapest -0.349*** -0.332*** -0.247*** -0.215***
(0.0756) (0.0758) (0.0762) (0.0744)
Married 0.0302 0.0865 0.0923
(0.0640) (0.0639) (0.0621)
Separated -0.241* -0.222* -0.160
(0.123) (0.135) (0.129)
Living w/ partner 0.0701 0.0444 0.0494
(0.0741) (0.0703) (0.0693)
Widow 0.0939 0.0515 0.0856
(0.0895) (0.0837) (0.0748)
Divorced -0.00446 -0.0302 -0.0327
(0.0722) (0.0676) (0.0662)
Marital status missing -0.284** -0.256 -0.282
(0.112) (0.228) (0.218)
Nr. children: 1 -0.0851 -0.0303 -0.0454
(0.0579) (0.0559) (0.0548)
Nr. children: 2 -0.0144 0.0348 0.0235
(0.0617) (0.0592) (0.0562)
Nr. children: 3 0.0881 0.0841 0.0691
(0.0687) (0.0730) (0.0685)
Nr. children: 4 0.0844 0.0376 0.0465
(0.0971) (0.0986) (0.110)
Nr. children: 5+ 0.0817 0.0301 0.0376
(0.110) (0.0956) (0.0962)
21.000 HUF < income < 40.000 HUF 0.117 0.187
(0.342) (0.318)
41.000 HUF < income < 70.000 HUF 0.0961 0.179
(0.340) (0.315)
71.000 HUF < income < 100.000 HUF 0.145 0.202
(0.338) (0.313)
101.000 HUF < income < 150.000 HUF -0.00611 0.0611
(0.337) (0.313)
151.000 HUF < income < 200.000 HUF -0.0360 0.0540
(0.338) (0.315)
201.000 HUF < income < 300.000 HUF -0.185 -0.0802
(0.340) (0.317)
301.000 HUF < income < 500.000 HUF -0.166 -0.0165
(0.348) (0.339)
income, missing 0.0148 0.0793
(0.336) (0.312)
wealth index -0.189*** -0.180***
(0.0258) (0.0261)
wealth, missing -0.0795 -0.0717
(0.105) (0.106)
financial difficulties, index 0.0315 0.0263
(0.0242) (0.0244)
financial difficulties, missing = o, - -
Works for public company 0.308***
(0.0584)
Other 0.371***
(0.0519)
public servant, missing 0.286**
(0.121)
Employee -0.112*
(0.0678)
Unemployed -0.0430
(0.0952)
Retired -0.0412
(0.0578)
Inactive -0.0190
(0.0952)
Student 0.197
(0.182)
Other 0.0105
(0.245)
Constant 0.821*** 0.818*** 0.788*** 0.854*** 0.755*** 0.654* 0.0848
(0.0981) (0.101) (0.192) (0.205) (0.221) (0.391) (0.386)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.018 0.021 0.094 0.165 0.184 0.287 0.326
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 19: The association of time preference with the probability employment, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES R has a job R has a job R has a job R has a job R has a job R has a job R has a job
delta 0.0117 -0.0777 -0.120 -0.133 -0.165* -0.175** -0.155*
(0.113) (0.115) (0.0835) (0.0844) (0.0854) (0.0862) (0.0807)
present-biased, dummy 0.0148 -0.00539 -0.0489 -0.0316 -0.0420 -0.0391 -0.0381
(0.0413) (0.0424) (0.0334) (0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0318)
future-biased, dummy 0.0683 0.0515 0.0220 0.0261 0.0174 0.0190 0.00106
(0.0449) (0.0460) (0.0371) (0.0366) (0.0357) (0.0357) (0.0336)
risk % 0.00185*** 0.000327 0.000271 0.000214 0.000191 -0.000240
(0.000547) (0.000433) (0.000444) (0.000444) (0.000446) (0.000430)
age 0.0520*** 0.0516*** 0.0515*** 0.0515*** 0.0481***
(0.00738) (0.00751) (0.00825) (0.00830) (0.00787)
age2 -0.000675*** -0.000670*** -0.000642*** -0.000640*** -0.000606***
(7.40e-05) (7.51e-05) (8.18e-05) (8.24e-05) (7.90e-05)
female -0.116*** -0.108*** -0.0912*** -0.0949*** -0.0343
(0.0286) (0.0285) (0.0295) (0.0301) (0.0295)
roma -0.208*** -0.197*** -0.170** -0.158** -0.0602
(0.0676) (0.0679) (0.0691) (0.0692) (0.0697)
region==Central Transdanubia 0.0670 0.0788 0.0812 0.00210
(0.0587) (0.0602) (0.0601) (0.0611)
region==Western Transdanubia 0.0290 0.0179 0.0212 -0.0359
(0.0719) (0.0712) (0.0710) (0.0719)
region==Southern Transdanubia 0.0799 0.0839 0.0815 0.0943
(0.0633) (0.0638) (0.0639) (0.0658)
region==Northern Hungary 0.0361 0.0534 0.0527 0.0316
(0.0571) (0.0584) (0.0587) (0.0577)
region==Northern Great Plain -0.0174 0.00958 0.0113 0.00754
(0.0562) (0.0574) (0.0572) (0.0602)
region==Southern Great Plain 0.0803 0.118** 0.119** 0.123**
(0.0580) (0.0588) (0.0593) (0.0590)
stype==town 0.0200 0.00419 -0.00179 0.0184
(0.0351) (0.0348) (0.0352) (0.0320)
stype==city -0.0317 -0.0409 -0.0491 -0.0402
(0.0514) (0.0504) (0.0504) (0.0459)
stype==Budapest 0.156*** 0.138** 0.126** 0.0878
(0.0553) (0.0558) (0.0575) (0.0572)
Married -0.0320 -0.0309 -0.0226
(0.0446) (0.0443) (0.0414)
Separated -0.0665 -0.0752 -0.0218
(0.113) (0.114) (0.117)
Living w/ partner 0.0741 0.0767 0.0638
(0.0514) (0.0513) (0.0479)
Widow -0.0922 -0.0887 -0.0915
(0.0663) (0.0665) (0.0600)
Divorced 0.0329 0.0326 0.0511
(0.0580) (0.0578) (0.0508)
Marital status missing 0.112 0.102 0.104
(0.0718) (0.0699) (0.109)
Nr. children: 1 0.0287 0.0254 -0.0143
(0.0400) (0.0400) (0.0380)
Nr. children: 2 -0.0507 -0.0513 -0.0776*
(0.0469) (0.0470) (0.0435)
Nr. children: 3 -0.201*** -0.198*** -0.195***
(0.0606) (0.0606) (0.0572)
Nr. children: 4 -0.104 -0.100 -0.0464
(0.115) (0.117) (0.106)
Nr. children: 5+ -0.222 -0.219 -0.248*
(0.140) (0.138) (0.138)
low education level -0.0387 0.000714
(0.0336) (0.0324)
high education level -0.00241 -0.0421
(0.0406) (0.0392)
21.000 HUF < income < 40.000 HUF 0.266**
(0.117)
41.000 HUF < income < 70.000 HUF 0.486***
(0.113)
71.000 HUF < income < 100.000 HUF 0.701***
(0.103)
101.000 HUF < income < 150.000 HUF 0.814***
(0.0966)
151.000 HUF < income < 200.000 HUF 0.907***
(0.101)
201.000 HUF < income < 300.000 HUF 0.920***
(0.106)
301.000 HUF < income < 500.000 HUF 0.942***
(0.114)
income, missing 0.695***
(0.0988)
wealth index 0.0107
(0.0244)
wealth, missing -0.173**
(0.0772)
financial difficulties, index -0.00236
(0.0175)
financial difficulties, missing = o, -
Constant 0.579*** 0.588*** 0.00850 -0.0454 -0.0463 -0.0180 -0.700***
(0.0977) (0.0990) (0.183) (0.193) (0.206) (0.208) (0.201)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.003 0.018 0.391 0.405 0.428 0.430 0.514
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 20: The association of time preference with income, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES income income income income income income income
delta 25,611* 16,222 5,156 -110.6 3,039 -14,834 -7,315
(15,464) (15,564) (14,009) (14,103) (14,336) (12,541) (10,877)
present-biased, dummy -4,528 -7,264 -9,571* -5,259 -5,871 -2,400 -1,593
(5,736) (5,777) (5,507) (5,482) (5,525) (5,016) (4,386)
future-biased, dummy 5,115 4,633 3,140 4,715 5,467 4,884 2,057
(6,367) (6,378) (5,813) (5,909) (5,831) (5,261) (4,689)
risk % 441.7*** 364.2*** 281.3*** 290.0*** 262.6*** 254.6***
(79.87) (74.36) (76.60) (76.37) (67.38) (59.15)
age 2,014** 1,998** 1,516* 1,214 -561.4
(807.4) (790.8) (836.7) (748.8) (671.3)
age2 -24.09*** -23.72*** -20.86*** -16.26** 4.495
(7.433) (7.297) (7.794) (6.804) (6.296)
female -24,229*** -24,453*** -25,971*** -31,342*** -24,937***
(4,571) (4,530) (4,656) (4,303) (3,933)
roma -48,563*** -44,546*** -43,551*** -29,710*** -20,746***
(7,255) (7,201) (7,616) (7,410) (7,052)
region==Central Transdanubia 14,660 16,361 14,888 7,634
(10,587) (10,797) (10,197) (9,645)
region==Western Transdanubia 9,968 10,418 12,441 8,602
(11,600) (11,857) (10,487) (10,390)
region==Southern Transdanubia -12,096 -11,836 -15,493 -13,759
(11,839) (12,025) (10,787) (10,590)
region==Northern Hungary -2,878 -1,431 -5,649 -6,234
(10,072) (10,431) (9,940) (9,230)
region==Northern Great Plain -9,739 -9,356 -9,659 -8,873
(9,552) (9,719) (9,387) (9,119)
region==Southern Great Plain -14,763 -11,936 -9,722 -14,614
(9,892) (10,351) (10,102) (9,313)
stype==town -3,012 -2,500 -7,762 -5,722
(5,139) (5,305) (4,761) (4,349)
stype==city 3,838 4,321 -3,586 2,112
(7,795) (7,870) (7,234) (5,960)
stype==Budapest 20,823* 23,799** 5,545 986.4
(10,936) (11,396) (10,688) (10,017)
Married -2,485 -3,268 -1,765
(7,791) (7,795) (7,273)
Separated -7,932 -18,886 -5,896
(17,168) (14,395) (12,334)
Living w/ partner -1,616 1,921 -170.6
(8,301) (7,930) (7,576)
Widow 4,904 7,959 8,339
(9,544) (8,444) (8,269)
Divorced 2,297 371.5 -2,739
(8,985) (8,266) (7,582)
Marital status missing -15,193 -28,843 -34,177
(29,008) (22,014) (23,727)
Nr. children: 1 13,825** 13,905** 12,020*
(6,810) (6,891) (6,598)
Nr. children: 2 14,222** 12,730* 14,560**
(7,092) (7,031) (6,714)
Nr. children: 3 2,255 4,030 15,361*
(8,612) (8,994) (8,326)
Nr. children: 4 -10,748 -15,538 2,900
(15,243) (18,005) (13,998)
Nr. children: 5+ 10,464 11,602 25,909**
(14,889) (13,506) (11,617)
low education level -21,005*** -17,587***
(4,665) (4,134)
high education level 44,271*** 42,346***
(8,025) (7,359)
Works for public company -18,515*
(9,684)
Other -6,990
(9,464)
public servant, missing -18,422
(15,430)
Employee 34,853***
(10,381)
Unemployed -63,399***
(9,930)
Retired -31,531***
(6,450)
Inactive -62,702***
(9,573)
Student -81,556***
(14,414)
Other -64,035*
(35,678)
Constant 106,805*** 98,571*** 93,172*** 96,526*** 101,026*** 131,593*** 175,934***
(13,228) (13,231) (25,408) (26,212) (26,657) (22,997) (22,516)
Observations 681 651 651 651 651 651 651
R2 0.007 0.067 0.179 0.231 0.245 0.373 0.509
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 21: The association of time preference with wealth, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index wealth index
delta 0.593*** 0.539*** 0.375** 0.299* 0.239 0.117 0.124
(0.165) (0.173) (0.165) (0.161) (0.156) (0.151) (0.149)
present-biased, dummy -0.0586 -0.0755 -0.100* -0.0832 -0.104* -0.0762 -0.0763
(0.0589) (0.0603) (0.0578) (0.0582) (0.0551) (0.0520) (0.0515)
future-biased, dummy 0.121* 0.109 0.0689 0.0596 0.0320 0.0411 0.0395
(0.0667) (0.0703) (0.0669) (0.0663) (0.0606) (0.0561) (0.0555)
risk % 0.00129 0.000999 0.000480 0.000539 0.000193 9.99e-05
(0.000851) (0.000824) (0.000835) (0.000794) (0.000736) (0.000731)
age 0.0295*** 0.0272*** -0.000469 -0.00449 -0.00777
(0.00807) (0.00821) (0.00896) (0.00880) (0.00909)
age2 -0.000348*** -0.000324*** -5.36e-05 4.80e-06 3.45e-05
(7.80e-05) (7.93e-05) (8.79e-05) (8.59e-05) (8.98e-05)
female 0.0114 0.00530 0.0564 0.0145 0.0525
(0.0517) (0.0505) (0.0494) (0.0471) (0.0471)
roma -0.846*** -0.807*** -0.713*** -0.563*** -0.494***
(0.0837) (0.0817) (0.0892) (0.0845) (0.0845)
region==Central Transdanubia 0.0768 0.141* 0.147* 0.148*
(0.0881) (0.0838) (0.0820) (0.0810)
region==Western Transdanubia 0.0610 0.0817 0.120 0.137*
(0.0941) (0.0899) (0.0813) (0.0809)
region==Southern Transdanubia 0.101 0.145 0.106 0.106
(0.0940) (0.0889) (0.0871) (0.0855)
region==Northern Hungary -0.0456 0.0151 -0.00624 -0.00257
(0.0818) (0.0797) (0.0772) (0.0778)
region==Northern Great Plain -0.0298 0.00482 0.0127 0.0434
(0.0821) (0.0778) (0.0767) (0.0792)
region==Southern Great Plain -0.0785 0.0112 0.00306 -0.00496
(0.0923) (0.0913) (0.0858) (0.0855)
stype==town 0.0751 0.0701 0.00384 -0.00186
(0.0538) (0.0511) (0.0481) (0.0479)
stype==city 0.248*** 0.211*** 0.106 0.108
(0.0750) (0.0739) (0.0703) (0.0716)
stype==Budapest 0.339*** 0.374*** 0.196** 0.195**
(0.0957) (0.0896) (0.0859) (0.0835)
Married 0.365*** 0.380*** 0.391***
(0.0800) (0.0797) (0.0792)
Separated 0.158 0.0181 0.00400
(0.207) (0.232) (0.263)
Living w/ partner -0.0539 -0.0200 -0.0102
(0.0860) (0.0828) (0.0832)
Widow -0.127 -0.0884 -0.0916
(0.108) (0.104) (0.103)
Divorced -0.0659 -0.0601 -0.0724
(0.0879) (0.0846) (0.0843)
Marital status missing 0.191 0.0654 0.0712
(0.274) (0.239) (0.251)
Nr. children: 1 0.170** 0.149** 0.167**
(0.0702) (0.0700) (0.0685)
Nr. children: 2 0.137* 0.131* 0.159**
(0.0719) (0.0697) (0.0695)
Nr. children: 3 -0.0165 0.0138 0.0823
(0.0885) (0.0950) (0.0930)
Nr. children: 4 -0.202 -0.204 -0.0406
(0.126) (0.134) (0.134)
Nr. children: 5+ -0.228 -0.196 -0.0737
(0.228) (0.210) (0.211)
low education level -0.341*** -0.328***
(0.0501) (0.0488)
high education level 0.239*** 0.236***
(0.0789) (0.0767)
Works for public company -0.102
(0.108)
Other 0.0101
(0.104)
public servant, missing -0.374
(0.240)
Employee 0.250*
(0.134)
Unemployed -0.200*
(0.108)
Retired -0.0215
(0.0762)
Inactive -0.302***
(0.114)
Student 0.445*
(0.263)
Other -0.566*
(0.337)
Constant -0.504*** -0.504*** -0.820*** -0.823*** -0.370 -0.0160 0.0365
(0.141) (0.149) (0.245) (0.254) (0.254) (0.250) (0.281)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.022 0.025 0.126 0.163 0.260 0.345 0.371
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 22: The association of time preference with banking decisions, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions
VARIABLES bank bank bank bank bank bank bank bank
delta 0.756*** 0.623*** 0.460** 0.468** 0.385* 0.286 0.291 0.318
(0.221) (0.231) (0.208) (0.214) (0.206) (0.203) (0.195) (0.195)
present-biased, dummy 0.128* 0.116 0.0568 0.0390 0.0162 0.0400 0.0549 0.0584
(0.0708) (0.0717) (0.0631) (0.0645) (0.0636) (0.0612) (0.0610) (0.0603)
future-biased, dummy 0.107 0.0901 0.0323 0.0242 0.0303 0.0389 0.0148 0.0207
(0.0855) (0.0872) (0.0766) (0.0776) (0.0758) (0.0735) (0.0742) (0.0723)
risk % 0.00327*** 0.00166* 0.000935 0.000933 0.000657 0.000162 0.000219
(0.000942) (0.000853) (0.000853) (0.000853) (0.000835) (0.000828) (0.000837)
age 0.0669*** 0.0679*** 0.0433*** 0.0404*** 0.0399*** 0.0350***
(0.00931) (0.00932) (0.0116) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0125)
age2 -0.000860*** -0.000869*** -0.000635*** -0.000591*** -0.000573*** -0.000487***
(9.83e-05) (9.80e-05) (0.000118) (0.000116) (0.000117) (0.000133)
female -0.0658 -0.0765 -0.0441 -0.0787 -0.0276 -0.0268
(0.0563) (0.0567) (0.0582) (0.0567) (0.0585) (0.0590)
roma -0.798*** -0.757*** -0.673*** -0.550*** -0.330** -0.324**
(0.160) (0.160) (0.151) (0.151) (0.159) (0.157)
region==Central Transdanubia 0.0103 0.0334 0.0409 -0.0446 -0.0426
(0.108) (0.108) (0.105) (0.113) (0.116)
region==Western Transdanubia -0.0599 -0.0876 -0.0564 -0.123 -0.113
(0.120) (0.121) (0.118) (0.119) (0.123)
region==Southern Transdanubia -0.260** -0.251** -0.282** -0.297** -0.308**
(0.127) (0.124) (0.123) (0.121) (0.128)
region==Northern Hungary -0.109 -0.0611 -0.0770 -0.0889 -0.108
(0.114) (0.114) (0.112) (0.114) (0.117)
region==Northern Great Plain -0.229** -0.219* -0.211* -0.200* -0.182
(0.114) (0.117) (0.114) (0.119) (0.123)
region==Southern Great Plain -0.00566 0.0269 0.0221 0.0305 -0.0179
(0.101) (0.103) (0.103) (0.108) (0.111)
stype==town 0.0602 0.0446 -0.0103 0.00882 -0.00476
(0.0680) (0.0663) (0.0654) (0.0653) (0.0649)
stype==city 0.182** 0.158* 0.0728 0.0532 0.0541
(0.0826) (0.0819) (0.0803) (0.0807) (0.0769)
stype==Budapest -0.0774 -0.0684 -0.211* -0.284** -0.297**
(0.117) (0.116) (0.118) (0.117) (0.120)
Married 0.299** 0.311*** 0.233** 0.238**
(0.116) (0.111) (0.118) (0.117)
Separated 0.0769 -0.0342 0.00989 0.0270
(0.220) (0.241) (0.222) (0.227)
Living w/ partner 0.287*** 0.314*** 0.311*** 0.300***
(0.107) (0.105) (0.107) (0.108)
Widow 0.0677 0.0998 0.117 0.121
(0.152) (0.145) (0.147) (0.147)
Divorced 0.233* 0.237* 0.268** 0.259**
(0.133) (0.125) (0.123) (0.121)
Marital status missing 0.539* 0.435 0.437** 0.403*
(0.310) (0.299) (0.216) (0.235)
Nr. children: 1 0.113 0.0931 0.0214 0.0280
(0.0972) (0.0914) (0.0904) (0.0923)
Nr. children: 2 0.147 0.142 0.0802 0.0889
(0.0975) (0.0926) (0.0918) (0.0943)
Nr. children: 3 -0.105 -0.0790 -0.0842 -0.0262
(0.132) (0.134) (0.129) (0.130)
Nr. children: 4 -0.468* -0.464* -0.377 -0.341
(0.262) (0.244) (0.256) (0.249)
Nr. children: 5+ -0.625** -0.598** -0.579** -0.506*
(0.272) (0.261) (0.256) (0.259)
low education level -0.293*** -0.178*** -0.183***
(0.0642) (0.0680) (0.0661)
high education level 0.166** 0.0738 0.0745
(0.0668) (0.0663) (0.0748)
21.000 HUF < income < 40.000 HUF -0.318 -0.224
(0.330) (0.403)
41.000 HUF < income < 70.000 HUF -0.0983 -0.0968
(0.297) (0.381)
71.000 HUF < income < 100.000 HUF 0.0607 -0.0188
(0.277) (0.369)
101.000 HUF < income < 150.000 HUF 0.210 0.117
(0.271) (0.367)
151.000 HUF < income < 200.000 HUF 0.270 0.140
(0.272) (0.369)
201.000 HUF < income < 300.000 HUF 0.332 0.196
(0.282) (0.375)
301.000 HUF < income < 500.000 HUF 0.292 0.153
(0.309) (0.395)
income, missing 0.107 0.0184
(0.271) (0.365)
wealth index 0.229*** 0.211***
(0.0478) (0.0482)
wealth, missing -0.0334 -0.0831
(0.212) (0.192)
financial difficulties, index 0.00566 0.00283
(0.0375) (0.0382)
financial difficulties, missing = o, - -
findec m -0.0718 -0.0655
(0.145) (0.140)
Works for public company -0.0735
(0.0994)
Other -0.0583
(0.0963)
public servant, missing -0.303
(0.246)
Employee -0.0102
(0.0994)
Unemployed -0.338**
(0.169)
Retired -0.233**
(0.104)
Inactive -0.170
(0.151)
Student 0.322
(0.284)
Other -1.361***
(0.394)
Constant -0.680*** -0.694*** -1.391*** -1.339*** -0.944*** -0.656** -0.796** -0.563
(0.195) (0.202) (0.269) (0.279) (0.306) (0.314) (0.388) (0.498)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.022 0.034 0.239 0.253 0.294 0.331 0.380 0.403
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 23: The association of time preference with savings decisions, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions financial decisions
VARIABLES saving saving saving saving saving saving saving saving
delta 0.599*** 0.549*** 0.551*** 0.445*** 0.475*** 0.433*** 0.409*** 0.403**
(0.167) (0.173) (0.172) (0.167) (0.161) (0.161) (0.157) (0.157)
present-biased, dummy -0.129** -0.145** -0.141** -0.119** -0.0908 -0.0884 -0.0598 -0.0526
(0.0558) (0.0579) (0.0586) (0.0585) (0.0581) (0.0575) (0.0545) (0.0552)
future-biased, dummy 0.0163 -0.00899 -0.00659 -0.0143 -0.00682 -0.0124 -0.00569 0.00562
(0.0687) (0.0719) (0.0717) (0.0698) (0.0679) (0.0670) (0.0656) (0.0658)
risk % 0.000762 0.000822 0.000984 0.000926 0.000783 0.000271 0.000117
(0.000927) (0.000933) (0.000947) (0.000936) (0.000909) (0.000860) (0.000856)
age 0.00360 0.00381 0.0117 0.00767 0.00612 0.00922
(0.00811) (0.00838) (0.00988) (0.00986) (0.00997) (0.0107)
age2 -1.35e-05 -1.36e-05 -9.96e-05 -5.80e-05 -2.96e-05 -5.48e-05
(8.17e-05) (8.47e-05) (9.67e-05) (9.65e-05) (9.65e-05) (0.000105)
female -0.0544 -0.0534 -0.0624 -0.0724 -0.0546 -0.0551
(0.0512) (0.0510) (0.0519) (0.0516) (0.0511) (0.0518)
roma -0.0587 -0.0419 -0.0596 -0.0175 0.135 0.135
(0.0852) (0.0837) (0.0836) (0.0849) (0.0885) (0.0881)
region==Central Transdanubia 0.134 0.133 0.117 0.0512 0.0379
(0.101) (0.104) (0.104) (0.109) (0.108)
region==Western Transdanubia 0.108 0.101 0.109 0.0543 0.0493
(0.104) (0.110) (0.110) (0.115) (0.116)
region==Southern Transdanubia 0.140 0.150 0.132 0.101 0.0668
(0.104) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.110)
region==Northern Hungary 0.0329 0.0167 0.000785 -0.0156 -0.0113
(0.0883) (0.0938) (0.0942) (0.104) (0.103)
region==Northern Great Plain 0.320*** 0.318*** 0.310*** 0.296*** 0.257**
(0.0951) (0.0982) (0.0983) (0.106) (0.106)
region==Southern Great Plain 0.0945 0.103 0.0879 0.0810 0.0923
(0.0950) (0.0982) (0.100) (0.107) (0.104)
stype==town -0.0326 -0.0233 -0.0369 -0.0299 -0.0309
(0.0543) (0.0556) (0.0561) (0.0546) (0.0547)
stype==city -0.0216 -0.0295 -0.0633 -0.0704 -0.0744
(0.0808) (0.0806) (0.0799) (0.0796) (0.0774)
stype==Budapest 0.303*** 0.301*** 0.229** 0.146 0.114
(0.108) (0.108) (0.108) (0.112) (0.110)
Married -0.0597 -0.0554 -0.136 -0.151
(0.0977) (0.0978) (0.0976) (0.0994)
Separated -0.0183 -0.0828 -0.0267 -0.0768
(0.196) (0.182) (0.217) (0.207)
Living w/ partner -0.167 -0.156 -0.123 -0.140
(0.104) (0.105) (0.0985) (0.0992)
Widow 0.0353 0.0425 0.0829 0.0838
(0.112) (0.110) (0.109) (0.111)
Divorced -0.116 -0.107 -0.0617 -0.0834
(0.103) (0.103) (0.103) (0.102)
Marital status missing 0.712 0.680 0.669 0.706
(0.812) (0.751) (0.669) (0.681)
Nr. children: 1 -0.0268 -0.0181 -0.0900 -0.110
(0.0743) (0.0752) (0.0716) (0.0721)
Nr. children: 2 -0.0188 -0.0192 -0.0776 -0.102
(0.0763) (0.0768) (0.0734) (0.0740)
Nr. children: 3 0.0125 0.0125 -0.00525 -0.0550
(0.0943) (0.0965) (0.0944) (0.0919)
Nr. children: 4 0.484* 0.449* 0.472** 0.410*
(0.249) (0.231) (0.237) (0.222)
Nr. children: 5+ 0.107 0.111 0.121 0.0611
(0.177) (0.178) (0.200) (0.192)
low education level 0.00261 0.110* 0.0973*
(0.0576) (0.0575) (0.0576)
high education level 0.268*** 0.168** 0.180**
(0.0844) (0.0813) (0.0896)
21.000 HUF < income < 40.000 HUF -0.539 -0.512
(0.429) (0.368)
41.000 HUF < income < 70.000 HUF -0.525 -0.465
(0.426) (0.368)
71.000 HUF < income < 100.000 HUF -0.659 -0.564
(0.420) (0.362)
101.000 HUF < income < 150.000 HUF -0.626 -0.518
(0.422) (0.364)
151.000 HUF < income < 200.000 HUF -0.555 -0.420
(0.424) (0.369)
201.000 HUF < income < 300.000 HUF -0.403 -0.296
(0.435) (0.380)
301.000 HUF < income < 500.000 HUF 0.723 0.798
(0.531) (0.501)
income, missing -0.652 -0.571
(0.420) (0.359)
wealth index 0.249*** 0.248***
(0.0464) (0.0463)
wealth, missing 0.123 0.159
(0.127) (0.133)
financial difficulties, index -0.0192 -0.0205
(0.0331) (0.0331)
financial difficulties, missing = o, - -
findec m 0.00472 -0.0146
(0.0966) (0.102)
Works for public company 0.219**
(0.102)
Other 0.200**
(0.0963)
public servant, missing 0.204
(0.212)
Employee 0.307**
(0.120)
Unemployed 0.143
(0.140)
Retired 0.0543
(0.0811)
Inactive 0.297**
(0.132)
Student 0.0165
(0.243)
Other 0.391*
(0.201)
Constant -0.420*** -0.401*** -0.512** -0.594** -0.731*** -0.625** 0.0235 -0.343
(0.139) (0.145) (0.242) (0.260) (0.263) (0.267) (0.478) (0.473)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.025 0.026 0.031 0.061 0.085 0.106 0.195 0.216
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 24: The association of time preference with financial troubles, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties financial difficulties
VARIABLES index index index index index index index index
delta -0.258 -0.234 -0.124 -0.195 -0.172 -0.123 -0.122 -0.116
(0.190) (0.208) (0.187) (0.191) (0.185) (0.181) (0.181) (0.184)
present-biased, dummy 0.154** 0.172** 0.170** 0.163** 0.179** 0.169** 0.167** 0.157**
(0.0738) (0.0778) (0.0747) (0.0728) (0.0737) (0.0710) (0.0696) (0.0699)
future-biased, dummy -0.0467 -0.0552 -0.0375 -0.0601 -0.0365 -0.0389 -0.0199 -0.0170
(0.0599) (0.0643) (0.0607) (0.0600) (0.0621) (0.0608) (0.0618) (0.0633)
risk % -6.63e-05 -0.000598 -0.000161 -5.38e-06 0.000138 0.000262 0.000175
(0.000941) (0.000906) (0.000965) (0.000954) (0.000949) (0.000923) (0.000903)
age -0.0136 -0.0137 -0.0161 -0.0141 -0.0155 -0.0183
(0.0146) (0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0187)
age2 8.10e-05 8.49e-05 6.52e-05 3.86e-05 4.55e-05 8.31e-05
(0.000135) (0.000137) (0.000147) (0.000146) (0.000145) (0.000170)
female -0.00741 -0.00682 -0.0477 -0.0314 -0.0517 -0.0553
(0.0574) (0.0562) (0.0552) (0.0546) (0.0538) (0.0531)
roma 0.674*** 0.682*** 0.612*** 0.552*** 0.446** 0.433**
(0.200) (0.197) (0.201) (0.205) (0.208) (0.213)
region==Central Transdanubia 0.0203 -0.0156 -0.0154 -0.0377 -0.0410
(0.0864) (0.0898) (0.0910) (0.0939) (0.0943)
region==Western Transdanubia 0.112 0.116 0.101 0.0976 0.100
(0.106) (0.106) (0.108) (0.107) (0.108)
region==Southern Transdanubia 0.150 0.133 0.149 0.114 0.103
(0.121) (0.126) (0.127) (0.106) (0.109)
region==Northern Hungary 0.0572 0.0180 0.0278 -0.0488 -0.0528
(0.0972) (0.101) (0.101) (0.0991) (0.0959)
region==Northern Great Plain 0.286*** 0.238** 0.236** 0.170 0.173
(0.105) (0.109) (0.107) (0.113) (0.109)
region==Southern Great Plain 0.201* 0.128 0.133 0.0432 0.0492
(0.118) (0.112) (0.112) (0.114) (0.113)
stype==town -0.0907 -0.0676 -0.0421 -0.0585 -0.0505
(0.0675) (0.0662) (0.0701) (0.0681) (0.0684)
stype==city 0.0204 0.0361 0.0783 0.0765 0.0950
(0.104) (0.104) (0.107) (0.101) (0.102)
stype==Budapest 0.107 0.128 0.202** 0.180* 0.186*
(0.0920) (0.0919) (0.101) (0.0973) (0.0956)
Married 0.0232 0.0175 0.0610 0.0483
(0.109) (0.108) (0.114) (0.116)
Separated -0.0621 -0.00318 0.0417 0.0165
(0.184) (0.185) (0.181) (0.176)
Living w/ partner -0.0297 -0.0433 -0.0211 -0.0423
(0.106) (0.105) (0.101) (0.108)
Widow 0.145 0.130 0.140 0.136
(0.132) (0.133) (0.134) (0.136)
Divorced 0.0885 0.0853 0.113 0.0983
(0.112) (0.111) (0.110) (0.111)
Marital status missing -0.222** -0.172 -0.153 -0.174
(0.103) (0.109) (0.134) (0.138)
Nr. children: 1 -0.00691 -0.000518 0.0102 0.00803
(0.0772) (0.0787) (0.0809) (0.0826)
Nr. children: 2 0.0895 0.0914 0.0925 0.0878
(0.0885) (0.0881) (0.0887) (0.0911)
Nr. children: 3 0.336** 0.326** 0.320** 0.317**
(0.141) (0.137) (0.138) (0.138)
Nr. children: 4 0.356* 0.361* 0.345 0.298
(0.214) (0.208) (0.222) (0.207)
Nr. children: 5+ 0.258 0.247 0.268 0.229
(0.297) (0.291) (0.281) (0.262)
low education level 0.121 0.0807 0.0738
(0.0742) (0.0785) (0.0796)
high education level -0.123** -0.0401 -0.0301
(0.0598) (0.0600) (0.0619)
21.000 HUF < income < 40.000 HUF -1.202 -1.265
(1.277) (1.339)
41.000 HUF < income < 70.000 HUF -1.455 -1.429
(1.256) (1.328)
71.000 HUF < income < 100.000 HUF -1.553 -1.534
(1.253) (1.328)
101.000 HUF < income < 150.000 HUF -1.459 -1.436
(1.251) (1.327)
151.000 HUF < income < 200.000 HUF -1.623 -1.596
(1.251) (1.327)
201.000 HUF < income < 300.000 HUF -1.677 -1.644
(1.252) (1.329)
301.000 HUF < income < 500.000 HUF -1.554 -1.503
(1.254) (1.331)
income, missing -1.650 -1.617
(1.252) (1.331)
wealth index -0.0866* -0.0854
(0.0523) (0.0531)
wealth, missing -0.233*** -0.186***
(0.0700) (0.0613)
financial difficulties, missing = o, - -
Works for public company 0.0917
(0.0789)
Other 0.0820
(0.0704)
public servant, missing 0.122
(0.246)
Employee -0.0550
(0.0721)
Unemployed 0.237
(0.199)
Retired -0.0405
(0.0849)
Inactive 0.0559
(0.212)
Student -0.176
(0.305)
Other -0.496***
(0.121)
Constant 0.191 0.176 0.511 0.463 0.529 0.389 2.029 1.986
(0.165) (0.168) (0.447) (0.430) (0.459) (0.438) (1.329) (1.432)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.013 0.015 0.071 0.089 0.108 0.119 0.158 0.167
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 25: The association of time preference with having bad health, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES health bad health bad health bad health bad health bad health bad health bad health bad
delta -0.0813 -0.0518 -0.00861 -0.0172 0.00404 0.0127 -0.00189 0.00794
(0.0712) (0.0722) (0.0689) (0.0697) (0.0685) (0.0690) (0.0654) (0.0640)
present-biased, dummy -0.0264 -0.0235 -0.0130 -0.00270 0.00307 0.00113 0.00202 0.00331
(0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0229) (0.0237) (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0227) (0.0228)
future-biased, dummy -0.0576** -0.0560** -0.0455* -0.0350 -0.0339 -0.0345 -0.0154 -0.0112
(0.0268) (0.0260) (0.0249) (0.0257) (0.0246) (0.0246) (0.0230) (0.0229)
risk % -0.000677*** -0.000265 -0.000120 -5.94e-05 -3.48e-05 0.000110 0.000149
(0.000259) (0.000237) (0.000257) (0.000256) (0.000256) (0.000246) (0.000241)
age 0.00271 0.00463 0.0111*** 0.0114*** 0.0110*** 0.0131***
(0.00333) (0.00329) (0.00379) (0.00380) (0.00383) (0.00424)
age2 2.34e-05 5.14e-06 -7.17e-05* -7.60e-05* -7.47e-05* -0.000127***
(3.68e-05) (3.59e-05) (4.05e-05) (4.08e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.64e-05)
female 0.0409** 0.0457** 0.0320* 0.0349* 0.0116 0.00862
(0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0193) (0.0197) (0.0186) (0.0189)
roma 0.169*** 0.158** 0.130** 0.119* 0.0462 0.0328
(0.0616) (0.0622) (0.0617) (0.0613) (0.0608) (0.0615)
region==Central Transdanubia 0.117*** 0.112*** 0.112*** 0.117*** 0.110***
(0.0343) (0.0333) (0.0330) (0.0355) (0.0371)
region==Western Transdanubia 0.00684 0.0228 0.0202 0.0262 0.0204
(0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0297) (0.0316) (0.0326)
region==Southern Transdanubia 0.0426 0.0510 0.0538 0.0424 0.0450
(0.0366) (0.0375) (0.0378) (0.0359) (0.0386)
region==Northern Hungary 0.0841** 0.0804** 0.0819** 0.0685* 0.0678*
(0.0355) (0.0363) (0.0364) (0.0352) (0.0346)
region==Northern Great Plain 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 0.113*** 0.110***
(0.0357) (0.0376) (0.0375) (0.0367) (0.0380)
region==Southern Great Plain 0.0668** 0.0619** 0.0626** 0.0438 0.0432
(0.0296) (0.0312) (0.0313) (0.0320) (0.0332)
stype==town -0.00402 0.00399 0.00862 4.91e-05 -0.00376
(0.0246) (0.0248) (0.0253) (0.0244) (0.0240)
stype==city -0.0567** -0.0462* -0.0387 -0.0365 -0.0358
(0.0261) (0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0274) (0.0280)
stype==Budapest 0.0765** 0.0842** 0.0968*** 0.0900** 0.0950**
(0.0354) (0.0342) (0.0373) (0.0356) (0.0370)
Married -0.0209 -0.0219 -0.00616 0.00293
(0.0283) (0.0281) (0.0280) (0.0270)
Separated -0.0816** -0.0716** -0.0671 -0.0597
(0.0342) (0.0362) (0.0416) (0.0396)
Living w/ partner -0.0325 -0.0349 -0.0204 -0.0119
(0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0293) (0.0302)
Widow 0.120* 0.117* 0.131** 0.125**
(0.0622) (0.0612) (0.0585) (0.0597)
Divorced 0.00679 0.00634 0.0114 0.0279
(0.0405) (0.0403) (0.0366) (0.0355)
Marital status missing -0.0188 -0.00993 -0.0203 -0.0157
(0.0471) (0.0458) (0.0330) (0.0354)
Nr. children: 1 -0.0438 -0.0424 -0.0353 -0.0251
(0.0284) (0.0279) (0.0256) (0.0265)
Nr. children: 2 -0.0516 -0.0512 -0.0417 -0.0322
(0.0352) (0.0347) (0.0322) (0.0338)
Nr. children: 3 0.0299 0.0278 0.0271 0.0382
(0.0479) (0.0482) (0.0461) (0.0482)
Nr. children: 4 0.0771 0.0775 0.0456 0.0704
(0.111) (0.111) (0.108) (0.111)
Nr. children: 5+ 0.245 0.243 0.236 0.241
(0.152) (0.153) (0.156) (0.160)
low education level 0.0234 -0.00107 0.00143
(0.0202) (0.0193) (0.0194)
high education level -0.0180 0.00571 -0.00499
(0.0232) (0.0248) (0.0246)
21.000 HUF < income < 40.000 HUF 0.0662 0.0599
(0.225) (0.236)
41.000 HUF < income < 70.000 HUF -0.146 -0.174
(0.214) (0.223)
71.000 HUF < income < 100.000 HUF -0.247 -0.272
(0.207) (0.218)
101.000 HUF < income < 150.000 HUF -0.337 -0.364*
(0.205) (0.216)
151.000 HUF < income < 200.000 HUF -0.290 -0.310
(0.207) (0.218)
201.000 HUF < income < 300.000 HUF -0.334 -0.352
(0.209) (0.219)
301.000 HUF < income < 500.000 HUF -0.319 -0.337
(0.210) (0.219)
income, missing -0.304 -0.331
(0.205) (0.215)
wealth index -0.0225 -0.0229
(0.0141) (0.0142)
wealth, missing 0.104 0.0903
(0.0718) (0.0706)
financial difficulties, index 9.51e-05 0.00213
(0.0135) (0.0137)
financial difficulties, missing = o, - -
Works for public company -0.0313
(0.0476)
Other -0.0371
(0.0452)
public servant, missing 0.0940
(0.135)
Employee -0.00696
(0.0186)
Unemployed -0.0395
(0.0650)
Retired 0.130***
(0.0413)
Inactive -0.0641
(0.0565)
Student -0.133
(0.139)
Other 0.00688
(0.139)
Constant 0.186*** 0.182*** -0.0963 -0.213** -0.332*** -0.357*** -0.0418 -0.00339
(0.0649) (0.0648) (0.0923) (0.102) (0.111) (0.114) (0.227) (0.250)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.007 0.013 0.110 0.135 0.176 0.179 0.264 0.283
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 26: The association of time preference with having good health, OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES health good health good health good health good health good health good health good health good
delta 0.275** 0.176 0.0913 0.0983 0.0719 0.0405 0.0833 0.0886
(0.111) (0.113) (0.0988) (0.0998) (0.100) (0.0996) (0.101) (0.0999)
present-biased, dummy 0.00836 -0.0118 -0.0429 -0.0412 -0.0440 -0.0365 -0.0345 -0.0348
(0.0397) (0.0405) (0.0339) (0.0345) (0.0338) (0.0336) (0.0334) (0.0339)
future-biased, dummy 0.0554 0.0413 0.0152 0.0185 0.0150 0.0176 0.00970 0.0127
(0.0439) (0.0443) (0.0381) (0.0391) (0.0388) (0.0383) (0.0377) (0.0376)
risk % 0.00243*** 0.00132*** 0.00120*** 0.00116** 0.00107** 0.000901* 0.000887*
(0.000492) (0.000447) (0.000465) (0.000464) (0.000462) (0.000460) (0.000461)
age -0.00827* -0.00770* -0.0160*** -0.0169*** -0.0160*** -0.0189***
(0.00438) (0.00447) (0.00538) (0.00535) (0.00543) (0.00597)
age2 -7.40e-05* -8.01e-05* 1.18e-05 2.61e-05 3.39e-05 0.000101*
(4.41e-05) (4.48e-05) (5.44e-05) (5.40e-05) (5.45e-05) (6.04e-05)
female -0.00516 -0.00233 0.0218 0.0108 0.0361 0.0411
(0.0294) (0.0295) (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0308) (0.0313)
roma -0.206*** -0.209*** -0.192** -0.154** -0.0612 -0.0500
(0.0731) (0.0737) (0.0765) (0.0778) (0.0779) (0.0776)
region==Central Transdanubia 0.0701 0.0660 0.0682 0.0887 0.0933
(0.0576) (0.0570) (0.0581) (0.0626) (0.0617)
region==Western Transdanubia 0.0646 0.0450 0.0549 0.0722 0.0864
(0.0715) (0.0723) (0.0716) (0.0727) (0.0729)
region==Southern Transdanubia 0.0281 0.0184 0.00858 0.0182 0.00853
(0.0696) (0.0699) (0.0700) (0.0695) (0.0691)
region==Northern Hungary 0.112* 0.105* 0.0999* 0.154** 0.156***
(0.0591) (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.0605) (0.0603)
region==Northern Great Plain -0.0150 -0.0301 -0.0276 0.0307 0.0364
(0.0567) (0.0570) (0.0568) (0.0595) (0.0593)
region==Southern Great Plain 0.0291 0.0376 0.0359 0.0903 0.0849
(0.0609) (0.0627) (0.0625) (0.0631) (0.0629)
stype==town 0.0656* 0.0627* 0.0453 0.0519 0.0503
(0.0348) (0.0345) (0.0347) (0.0337) (0.0336)
stype==city 0.0779* 0.0617 0.0345 0.0180 0.0247
(0.0444) (0.0440) (0.0432) (0.0437) (0.0417)
stype==Budapest 0.124** 0.120* 0.0746 0.0913 0.0814
(0.0623) (0.0619) (0.0622) (0.0634) (0.0635)
Married 0.0456 0.0492 0.00211 -0.00609
(0.0538) (0.0538) (0.0528) (0.0518)
Separated 0.148 0.113 0.0721 0.0666
(0.109) (0.107) (0.111) (0.110)
Living w/ partner 0.0764 0.0851* 0.0793* 0.0633
(0.0498) (0.0504) (0.0478) (0.0489)
Widow -0.129* -0.119 -0.135* -0.120*
(0.0732) (0.0732) (0.0714) (0.0704)
Divorced -0.0779 -0.0767 -0.103 -0.123*
(0.0645) (0.0648) (0.0633) (0.0627)
Marital status missing 0.195*** 0.163*** 0.193* 0.166
(0.0553) (0.0579) (0.106) (0.105)
Nr. children: 1 0.0872* 0.0811* 0.0718 0.0583
(0.0462) (0.0463) (0.0451) (0.0455)
Nr. children: 2 0.102** 0.101** 0.0889* 0.0762
(0.0514) (0.0513) (0.0497) (0.0511)
Nr. children: 3 -0.0236 -0.0154 -0.0180 -0.0214
(0.0676) (0.0683) (0.0659) (0.0669)
Nr. children: 4 -0.00992 -0.00915 0.00531 -0.0335
(0.0900) (0.0901) (0.0908) (0.0915)
Nr. children: 5+ 0.0214 0.0298 0.0337 0.0314
(0.165) (0.165) (0.163) (0.172)
low education level -0.0921*** -0.0521 -0.0639*
(0.0332) (0.0336) (0.0331)
high education level 0.0545 -0.00459 0.0341
(0.0414) (0.0430) (0.0447)
21.000 HUF < income < 40.000 HUF -0.0293 0.00147
(0.205) (0.205)
41.000 HUF < income < 70.000 HUF 0.0521 0.0919
(0.200) (0.200)
71.000 HUF < income < 100.000 HUF 0.115 0.132
(0.196) (0.197)
101.000 HUF < income < 150.000 HUF 0.152 0.168
(0.194) (0.196)
151.000 HUF < income < 200.000 HUF 0.277 0.287
(0.198) (0.201)
201.000 HUF < income < 300.000 HUF 0.294 0.290
(0.202) (0.205)
301.000 HUF < income < 500.000 HUF 0.245 0.254
(0.224) (0.230)
income, missing 0.304 0.315
(0.193) (0.194)
wealth index 0.0735*** 0.0696***
(0.0250) (0.0250)
wealth, missing -0.0465 -0.0280
(0.0702) (0.0690)
financial difficulties, index 0.0351* 0.0303
(0.0201) (0.0204)
financial difficulties, missing = o, - -
Works for public company 0.116*
(0.0656)
Other 0.156***
(0.0593)
public servant, missing 0.0725
(0.118)
Employee 0.000646
(0.0511)
Unemployed -0.0163
(0.0750)
Retired -0.167***
(0.0582)
Inactive 0.0667
(0.0733)
Student 0.0691
(0.116)
Other -0.359**
(0.147)
Constant 0.388*** 0.384*** 1.113*** 1.007*** 1.141*** 1.232*** 0.912*** 0.782***
(0.0973) (0.0979) (0.133) (0.146) (0.158) (0.157) (0.238) (0.272)
Observations 930 879 879 879 879 879 879 879
R2 0.009 0.033 0.294 0.304 0.330 0.342 0.388 0.406
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
